在自愿捐款博弈中提高效率和减少不平等的机制

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Rod Falvey , Tom Lane , Shravan Luckraz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在异质性禀赋的一般假设下,研究一类线性自愿贡献博弈。在此背景下,我们推广了Galbraith机制(GM),并从理论和实验两方面评估了其相对于固定的平均份额分配的性能。三个主要的实证结果出现了。首先,通用汽车大大提高了平均出资比例,高于平均出资比例。其次,通用汽车在提高效率的同时减少了收入不平等。第三,参与人的贡献和分配行为对其在禀赋分配中的位置很敏感。在他们所有的决策中,当他们富有时,代理人始终更加强调绝对贡献水平,而当他们贫穷时,他们更加强调贡献比率(相对于捐赠的贡献)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
On a mechanism that improves efficiency and reduces inequality in voluntary contribution games
We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we generalize the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) and assess its performance relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical results emerge. First, the GM raises average contributions significantly above those under an equal-shares allocation. Second, the GM simultaneously reduces income inequality as it improves efficiency. Third, a player's contribution and allocation behavior is sensitive to her position in the endowment distribution. In all their decision-making, agents consistently place greater emphasis on absolute contribution levels when they are rich, and on contribution ratios (contributions relative to endowments) when they are poor.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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