比赛中的移动顺序：均衡和获胜机会

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.003

Lei Gao , Jingfeng Lu , Zhewei Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了一般的二人序棋博弈，考虑了全谱的图洛克博弈技术和参赛者的不对称性。我们提供了在强领先和弱领先竞争中先占均衡获胜的充分必要条件，并发现了一个特征方程来确定非先占均衡获胜时玩家的努力比（这完全决定了他们获胜的机会）和努力水平。我们发现，虽然强者先走总是有更高的获胜几率，但同时移动有时会最大化弱者的获胜几率。我们进一步通过赢奇最大化教练员的自主选择，使移动指令内生。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances

This paper studies general two-player sequential-move competitions, accommodating a full spectrum of Tullock contest technology and contestants' asymmetry. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a preemptive equilibrium to prevail in both strong-lead and weak-lead contests, and discover a characteristic equation to pin down the players' effort ratio (which fully determines their winning chances) and their effort levels when a non-preemptive equilibrium prevails. We find that while the strong player always has a higher winning chance when moving first, simultaneous moves sometimes maximize the weak player's winning odds. We further allow the move orders endogenous through winning-odd-maximizing coaches' independent choices.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology