两两独裁认可型社会福利函数的表征

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-02-10 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112217

Gustavo Santos-García, José Carlos R. Alcantud

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文定义了认可性社会福利函数。当偏好的表达伴随着以一致的方式共同选择“批准”的替代方案时，它们是阿罗维社会福利函数的自然对应。首先，我们计算一致的偏好-认可概况（认可社会福利函数的领域）的数量。然后，我们证明了两两独裁行为的特征是不相关选择的一致性和独立性，这是阿罗在2009年由Brams和Sanver定义的限制版本的偏好-认可模型中对独裁的描述的复制。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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A characterization of pairwise dictatorial approbatory social welfare functions

This paper defines approbatory social welfare functions. They are the natural counterpart of Arrovian social welfare functions when the expression of preferences is accompanied by a common choice of “approved” alternatives in a consistent manner. First, we count the number of consistent preference-approval profiles (the domain of approbatory social welfare functions). Then we show that pairwise dictatorial behaviors are characterized by unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, a replication of Arrow’s characterization of dictatorships for this restricted version of the preference-approval model defined by Brams and Sanver in 2009.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.