The Moral Significance of Biofixtures: A Response to Nathan Goldstein, Bridget Tracy, and Rosamond Rhodes "But I have a pacer…there is no point in engaging in hypothetical scenarios": A Non-imminently Dying Patient's Request for Pacemaker Deactivation.

Based on the case report of Nathan Goldstein et al., "But I have a pacer…there is no point in engaging in hypothetical scenarios": A Non-imminently Dying Patient's Request for Pacemaker Deactivation, it is reasonable to conclude that it was, all-things-considered, ethically appropriate to grant the patient's request to deactivate her pacemaker. Philosophically, and as a clinical ethicist, I support the team's decision to honor the patient's request for pacemaker deactivation. However, it is worth exploring a bit further whether the distress on the part of the outside hospital's ethics committee and providers-who declined to honor the patient's request for pacemaker deactivation-may actually track something of moral significance. In this commentary, I argue that there are reasonable grounds for holding that deactivation of a 'biofixture' such as a pacemaker may be more analogous in moral terms to medical aid in dying than it is to standard cases of withdrawal of life support at the end of a patient's life.