基于Stackelberg-Nash博弈的公园多智能体集成能源系统低碳优化调度策略

IF 1.6 Q4 ENERGY & FUELS
Yanbo Chen, Jiaqi Li, Zhe Fang, Ning Zhang, Tao Huang, Zuomao Chen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在实现双碳目标的大背景下,园区是实践双碳目标的天然试验田。提出了一种基于Stackelberg-Nash博弈的多智能体公园集成能源系统(P-IES)低碳最优调度策略。首先,考虑P2G技术两阶段运行和奖惩分步碳交易机制,建立了低碳P-IES调度模型;在此基础上,提出了以园区一体化能源系统运营商(P-IESO)为主导,多个低碳P-IESO为追随者的两层博弈优化模型。其中,园区之间通过电力交易渠道互联互通。然后,通过迭代搜索法得到纳什均衡解,并证明博弈均衡解的唯一性,从而确定运营商的最优定价策略。最后,以某典型工业园区为例进行仿真验证。实例分析验证了该模型能够有效降低系统碳排放,提高园区经济效益和低碳水平,从而实现园区低碳与经济效益的协调发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Low-carbon optimal scheduling strategy for multi-agent integrated energy system of the park based on Stackelberg–Nash game

Low-carbon optimal scheduling strategy for multi-agent integrated energy system of the park based on Stackelberg–Nash game

Under the background of achieving the dual-carbon goal, the park is a natural experimental field for practicing the dual-carbon goal. A low-carbon optimal scheduling strategy for a multi-agent park-integrated energy system (P-IES) based on the Stackelberg–Nash game is proposed. Firstly, a low-carbon P-IES scheduling model is established, considering the two-stage operation of power-to-gas (P2G) technology and reward–punishment stepwise carbon trading mechanism. Then, a two-layer game optimisation model is proposed with a park-integrated energy system operator (P-IESO) as the leader and multiple low-carbon P-IESs as followers. Among them, the parks are connected with each other through the power trading channels. Then, the Nash equilibrium solution is obtained by the iterative search method, and the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution of the game is proven, so as to determine the optimal pricing strategy of the operator. Finally, a typical industrial park is taken as an example for simulation verification. The example analysis verifies that the model can effectively reduce the system's carbon emissions and improve the park's economic benefits and low-carbon levels, thereby achieving the coordinated development of low-carbon and economic performance in the park.

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来源期刊
IET Energy Systems Integration
IET Energy Systems Integration Engineering-Engineering (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
5.90
自引率
8.30%
发文量
29
审稿时长
11 weeks
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