探讨破产决议中对业务债权人的支付的准绝对优先规则:来自印度的证据

IF 5.5 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
S. Veena Iyer, Rohit Prasad
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们表明,绝对优先规则(APR)在清算收益分配中优先考虑金融债权人而不是经营债权人,这在解决过程中是不适当和不公平的,并剥夺了后者在重组企业中的价值份额。利用2016年《印度破产和破产法》(IBC)下破产解决案例的数据,我们研究了公平分配的另一种准apr规则,发现虽然总体上,经营性债权人获得的赔偿额与该规则没有显著差异,但清算溢价(清算收益超过资产清算价值)和经营性债权人的债权规模造成了组内分歧。实际动态符合金融债权人的机会主义行为,受到某些因素的调节。在修正的债权人讨价还价理论和基于价值的理论的精神下,我们提出了准apr规则作为一种透明和实用的解决方案,以实现资产和权益的价值保护。我们建议以准apr为基础的支付作为occ的最低支付。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Exploring a Quasi-absolute priority rule for pay-outs to operational creditors in bankruptcy resolutions: Evidence from India
We show that the Absolute Priority Rule (APR), which prioritizes financial creditors over operational creditors in the distribution of proceeds in liquidation, is inappropriate and unfair during resolution and deprives the latter of their share of value in the reorganized concern. Using data from bankruptcy resolution cases under the Indian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) 2016, we examine an alternate Quasi-APR rule for equitable distribution and find that while in the aggregate, the operational creditors get pay-outs not significantly different from this rule, there is intra-group divergence created by the liquidation premium (the excess of resolution proceeds over liquidation value of assets), and the operational creditors' claim size. The actual dynamics conform to opportunistic behaviour by the financial creditors, moderated by certain factors. In the spirit of the modified Creditors' Bargain Theory and the Values-based theory, we propose the quasi-APR rule as a transparent and pragmatic solution towards value-conservation of the asset and equity. We recommend the Quasi APR-based payout to be made the minimum payout for the OCs.
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来源期刊
Global Finance Journal
Global Finance Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
13.50%
发文量
106
审稿时长
53 days
期刊介绍: Global Finance Journal provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques among academicians and practitioners and, thereby, advances applied research in global financial management. Global Finance Journal publishes original, creative, scholarly research that integrates theory and practice and addresses a readership in both business and academia. Articles reflecting pragmatic research are sought in areas such as financial management, investment, banking and financial services, accounting, and taxation. Global Finance Journal welcomes contributions from scholars in both the business and academic community and encourages collaborative research from this broad base worldwide.
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