不动产租赁

IF 3.5 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Regional Science and Urban Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-18 DOI:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2025.104087

Dylan R. Clarke

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文建立了一个房屋发生财产损失的模型，承租人必须提出诉讼才能得到赔偿。该模型在市场租金和租金管制制度、有限财富租户、双边（租户）投资、共同保险和租金减免的情况下进行了分析。该模型有助于评估若干政策，如租金管制、房东-租客法、收入再分配、租客保险和租金减免。该模型做出了一些预测，这些预测与住房经济学的实证研究结果一致，比如为什么穷人住的房子条件更差，以及法律将责任转移到房东身上，如何提高了贫困租户的住房质量，同时提高了租金价格。它还包含了经典的假设，比如卡拉布雷西的严格责任规则的效率和最小成本规避者，除了澄清弗里德曼关于租金控制会减少投资的预测。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Leases over real property

This paper develops a model in which housing incurs a property damage for which the tenant must sue in order to be made whole. The model is analyzed under both market rents and rent control regimes, as well as for tenants with limited wealth, bilateral (tenant) investment, coinsurance, and rent abatement. The model facilitates the evaluation of several policies, such as rent control, landlord–tenant laws, income redistribution, tenant’s insurance, and rent abatement. The model makes several predictions which are consistent with empirical findings in housing economics, such as why the poor occupy housing of worse condition and how laws shifting liability onto the landlord increase the quality of housing for poor tenants as well as increase rent prices. It also nests classic hypotheses, such as the Calabresi’s efficiency of strict liability rules and the least cost avoider, in addition to clarifications on Friedman’s prediction that rent control decreases investment.

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来源期刊

Regional Science and Urban Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

5.30

自引率

9.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Regional Science and Urban Economics facilitates and encourages high-quality scholarship on important issues in regional and urban economics. It publishes significant contributions that are theoretical or empirical, positive or normative. It solicits original papers with a spatial dimension that can be of interest to economists. Empirical papers studying causal mechanisms are expected to propose a convincing identification strategy.