纯粹的享乐形象和用户规模:来自慈善独裁者游戏的证据

IF 2.3 2区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Sem Manna , Alessandro Stringhi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了独立于策略考虑的形象偏好(即纯粹的享乐形象关注)是否能激发亲社会行为,以及这种观众效应是否受观察者数量的调节。对现有实验文献中相关问题的回答往往是混合的,或受到当前情境或所采用的设计所引发的多种机制的影响。我们采用了一个实验,包括一个独裁者游戏和一个慈善接受者,以及一个具有明确社会效价的二元选择。选择是由一个匿名的、被动的、外部的观众观察的,他们的规模在不同的治疗中有所不同。我们简单的实验设计使我们能够从策略考虑和其他可选设计的混淆特征中分离出对利他主义的纯粹享乐形象的关注。我们发现,当有观众在场时,捐款平均增加了10.2个百分点,每增加一个旁观者,捐赠的可能性估计增加了2.12个百分点。我们提供的证据表明,观众的规模也很重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Purely hedonic image concerns and audience size: Evidence from a charity dictator game
We study whether image preferences in isolation from strategic considerations, namely purely hedonic image concerns, can motivate prosocial behavior and whether this audience effect is mediated by the number of observers. Answers to related questions from the extant experimental literature are often mixed or influenced by multiple mechanisms evoked by the context at hand or design employed. We employ an experiment involving a dictator game with a charity receiver and a binary choice with unambiguous social valence. Choices are observed by an anonymous, passive, and external audience whose size varies across treatments. Our simple experimental design allows us to isolate purely hedonic image concerns about appearing altruistic from strategic considerations and other confounding features of alternative designs. We find that donations rise by 10.2 percentage points on average when audiences are present, with every observer increasing the probability of donating by an estimated 2.12 percentage points. We provide evidence that the size of the audience also matters.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
31.40%
发文量
69
审稿时长
63 days
期刊介绍: The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.
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