忠诚夫妻的婚姻稳定性:揭示的偏好分析

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Mikhail Freer , Khushboo Surana
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了一个揭示的偏好特征的婚姻稳定,其中一些夫妇承诺。如果一对夫妇只有在双方同意的情况下才能离婚,那他们就是忠诚的。我们为识别家庭内部消费模式的表征潜力提供了理论见解。我们证明,如果没有潜在夫妇之间私人物品的价格变化,家庭内部资源分配只能确定为未承诺的夫妇。我们使用荷兰家庭数据进行模拟,以支持我们的理论发现。我们的研究结果表明,随着价格的变化,婚姻稳定性的实证含义允许识别家庭消费分配的承诺和非承诺的夫妇。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Marital stability with committed couples: A revealed preference analysis
We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the characterization for identifying intrahousehold consumption patterns. We demonstrate that without price variation for private goods among potential couples, intrahousehold resource allocations can only be identified for non-committed couples. We conduct simulations using Dutch household data to support our theoretical findings. Our results show that with price variation, the empirical implications of marital stability allow for the identification of household consumption allocations for both committed and non-committed couples.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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