管理层薪酬是否影响产品市场失灵的可能性？来自内部债务持有的证据

IF 7.2 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Corporate Finance Pub Date : 2024-12-10 DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2024.102726

Vincent J. Intintoli , Shweta Srinivasan

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了内部债务持有对产品市场召回可能性的影响。与内部债务更好地调整激励一致，我们发现它与随后的召回负相关。这种关系在管理者对供应链有更大控制权的行业和在审查严重召回时尤为明显。我们的结果不受公司财务约束或现金流风险的影响。内部债务对年龄较大、任期较长的高管的影响最大，表明管理层的风险规避发挥了重要作用。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，补偿政策可以通过减少昂贵的召回的可能性产生积极的影响。

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Does managerial compensation impact the likelihood of product market failures? Evidence from inside debt holdings

We study the impact of inside debt holdings on the likelihood of product market recalls. Consistent with inside debt better aligning incentives, we find it is negatively associated with subsequent recalls. This relation is pronounced for industries where managers have greater control over the supply chain and when examining severe recalls. Our results hold irrespective of the firm's financial constraints or cash flow risk. Inside debt has the greatest influence on older and longer tenured executives, indicating that managerial risk aversion plays an important role. Overall, our results indicate that compensation policies can have a positive effect by decreasing the likelihood of costly recalls.

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来源期刊

Journal of Corporate Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.80

自引率

3.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.