模糊性下的昂贵学习

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103079

Kemal Ozbek

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了一种通用的信息获取模型——代价贝叶斯学习（CBL）。使用菜单选择框架，我们提供了模型的公理化表征，确定其参数，应用比较静力学，并研究了模型的特殊情况。与许多突出的信息获取模型（例如，理性注意力不集中模型）不同，CBL代理可以表现出不确定性厌恶行为，并倾向于不确定性的后期解决。

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Costly learning under ambiguity

In this paper, we propose a general model of information acquisition, Costly Bayesian Learning (CBL). Using menu choice framework, we provide an axiomatic characterization of the model, identify its parameters, apply a comparative statics, as well as study special cases of the model. Unlike many prominent models of information acquisition (e.g., the Rational Inattention model), a CBL agent can exhibit uncertainty averse behavior and prefer late resolution of uncertainty.

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来源期刊

Journal of Mathematical Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

7.70%

发文量

审稿时长

12.5 weeks

期刊介绍： The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.