评论《印度经济:表现、政策、政治、前景与挑战》

IF 4.5 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Devesh Kapur
{"title":"评论《印度经济:表现、政策、政治、前景与挑战》","authors":"Devesh Kapur","doi":"10.1111/aepr.12490","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Panagariya (<span>2025</span>) provides a cogent summary of the performance of India's economy and the policies that shaped them and concludes with an optimist prognosis of India's future prospects despite some enduring challenges. These comments focus on three issues highlighted in the paper, continuing versus change, from socialism to statism, and future prospects, focusing particularly on the past quarter century.</p><p>There is broad agreement that 1991 was a decisive break point in Indian economic policy. Subsequently, however, and especially after 1998 when the Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government came to power, while each new government advanced new programs and projects, changes in economic <i>policies</i> writ large, have been more incremental. Indeed even many programs have seen continuity although the pace of change has varied. Thus, the Vajpayee-led NDA government launched a countrywide rural roads and highway construction program, which expanded over the next decade under successive governments. Indeed many public programs, be it housing, village electrification, drinking water, and sanitation, have been in existence for decades, but progress was lethargic. What changed under the Modi government was the ambition—universal coverage—and the rapid pace of implementation.</p><p>Similarly, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government launched the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). While much critiqued at the time, the program continued under its successor NDA government and had large positive externalities on rural wages and poverty, besides providing a safety net during the COVID years.</p><p>The continuity is also reflected in two major achievements of the Modi government—digital public infrastructure (DPI) and Goods and Services Tax (GST). The foundation of DPI—the universal biometric ID, <i>Aadhaar</i>, as well as the intellectual groundwork of the GST—were initiated by the predecessor government. Indeed continuity rather than disjuncture has also been the hallmark of India's economic growth in the past quarter century, which has not been especially different across different governments (and was probably strongest in the first post-2000 decade).</p><p>On policies, while there has been steady liberalization in a wide range of sectors that were hitherto taboo (including defense), the now chronic high fiscal deficits are emblematic of both an entrenched political economy and a tenacious <i>dirigisme</i> that is the DNA of the Indian state, no matter which government is in power. General government final consumption expenditure as percent of gross domestic product (GDP) was 10.4% in 2004 and 10.3% in 2013 (the last years of the Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh government's, respectively) and 10.3% in 2022. Capital employed in central public sector enterprises (CPSEs) expanded from ₹5 trillion to ₹17.7 trillion and then ₹38.2 trillion over the same period. Six of 10 largest Indian companies (by market cap) in 2023 were CPSEs. Between 2014/2015 and 2020/2021, the government infused ₹3.37 trillion (more than $50 billion) to shore up the balance sheets of public sector banks. While the UPA government stopped privatization initiated by the Vajpayee government, progress under the Modi-led NDA has also been tepid. If we add to this mix the revival of industrial policy, more interventionist trade policies, and regulatory unpredictability, statism continues to thrive in India.</p><p>The endemic statism—and its costs—are even more evident in agriculture, which even today employs the largest fraction of the labor force. Over the past three decades agriculture sectors which have less government intervention—horticulture and livestock (which are also more nutritious)—have grown substantially faster with a growing share in Indian diets. Yet public policy in India—across all governments—has been obsessed with the principal cereals (wheat and rice), which are lavished with subsidies, both on a range of inputs as well as outputs, even as their share in household consumption has been declining and mounting ecological damage.</p><p>Panagariya is somewhat sanguine about the India's growth prospects. As multinational corporations geared for a China+1 strategy, India should have been the logical top option. While some shift has occurred, smaller economies like Vietnam have done much better, with foreign direct investment (FDI) into India declining substantially in the last few years. Concurrently, domestic private investment has also declined (as share of GDP) in the last decade and, contrary to expectations, the large increase in public investment in infrastructure has not “crowded in” private investment.</p><p>Darkening geopolitical clouds can short-circuit exports, which have been an important engine of India's growth. India is not part key free trade agreements (FTAs) that would include it in global supply chains. It is also poorly equipped to cope with the medium- to long-term uncertainties due to climate changes.</p><p>India's most abundant resource is its people and through the rest of this century, it will remain the world's largest country by population. Yet it has done a singularly poor job in substantially improving its human capital, evident in poor learning outcomes at all stages of education and high morbidity rates.</p><p>Despite rapid growth, structural transformation been tepid, a consequence of entrenched problems rooted in the country's political economy. Many of these—agriculture, urbanization, electricity, water, education, health, environment—require coordinated actions by both the central and state governments. But the manner in which India's political economy has been evolving, with greater centralization at both the federal and subnational levels, have weakened the institutional mechanisms to bring this about.</p>","PeriodicalId":45430,"journal":{"name":"Asian Economic Policy Review","volume":"20 1","pages":"97-99"},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/aepr.12490","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Comment on “Indian Economy: Performance, Policies, Politics, and Prospects and Challenges”\",\"authors\":\"Devesh Kapur\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/aepr.12490\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Panagariya (<span>2025</span>) provides a cogent summary of the performance of India's economy and the policies that shaped them and concludes with an optimist prognosis of India's future prospects despite some enduring challenges. These comments focus on three issues highlighted in the paper, continuing versus change, from socialism to statism, and future prospects, focusing particularly on the past quarter century.</p><p>There is broad agreement that 1991 was a decisive break point in Indian economic policy. Subsequently, however, and especially after 1998 when the Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government came to power, while each new government advanced new programs and projects, changes in economic <i>policies</i> writ large, have been more incremental. Indeed even many programs have seen continuity although the pace of change has varied. Thus, the Vajpayee-led NDA government launched a countrywide rural roads and highway construction program, which expanded over the next decade under successive governments. Indeed many public programs, be it housing, village electrification, drinking water, and sanitation, have been in existence for decades, but progress was lethargic. What changed under the Modi government was the ambition—universal coverage—and the rapid pace of implementation.</p><p>Similarly, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government launched the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). While much critiqued at the time, the program continued under its successor NDA government and had large positive externalities on rural wages and poverty, besides providing a safety net during the COVID years.</p><p>The continuity is also reflected in two major achievements of the Modi government—digital public infrastructure (DPI) and Goods and Services Tax (GST). The foundation of DPI—the universal biometric ID, <i>Aadhaar</i>, as well as the intellectual groundwork of the GST—were initiated by the predecessor government. Indeed continuity rather than disjuncture has also been the hallmark of India's economic growth in the past quarter century, which has not been especially different across different governments (and was probably strongest in the first post-2000 decade).</p><p>On policies, while there has been steady liberalization in a wide range of sectors that were hitherto taboo (including defense), the now chronic high fiscal deficits are emblematic of both an entrenched political economy and a tenacious <i>dirigisme</i> that is the DNA of the Indian state, no matter which government is in power. General government final consumption expenditure as percent of gross domestic product (GDP) was 10.4% in 2004 and 10.3% in 2013 (the last years of the Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh government's, respectively) and 10.3% in 2022. Capital employed in central public sector enterprises (CPSEs) expanded from ₹5 trillion to ₹17.7 trillion and then ₹38.2 trillion over the same period. Six of 10 largest Indian companies (by market cap) in 2023 were CPSEs. Between 2014/2015 and 2020/2021, the government infused ₹3.37 trillion (more than $50 billion) to shore up the balance sheets of public sector banks. While the UPA government stopped privatization initiated by the Vajpayee government, progress under the Modi-led NDA has also been tepid. If we add to this mix the revival of industrial policy, more interventionist trade policies, and regulatory unpredictability, statism continues to thrive in India.</p><p>The endemic statism—and its costs—are even more evident in agriculture, which even today employs the largest fraction of the labor force. Over the past three decades agriculture sectors which have less government intervention—horticulture and livestock (which are also more nutritious)—have grown substantially faster with a growing share in Indian diets. Yet public policy in India—across all governments—has been obsessed with the principal cereals (wheat and rice), which are lavished with subsidies, both on a range of inputs as well as outputs, even as their share in household consumption has been declining and mounting ecological damage.</p><p>Panagariya is somewhat sanguine about the India's growth prospects. As multinational corporations geared for a China+1 strategy, India should have been the logical top option. While some shift has occurred, smaller economies like Vietnam have done much better, with foreign direct investment (FDI) into India declining substantially in the last few years. Concurrently, domestic private investment has also declined (as share of GDP) in the last decade and, contrary to expectations, the large increase in public investment in infrastructure has not “crowded in” private investment.</p><p>Darkening geopolitical clouds can short-circuit exports, which have been an important engine of India's growth. India is not part key free trade agreements (FTAs) that would include it in global supply chains. It is also poorly equipped to cope with the medium- to long-term uncertainties due to climate changes.</p><p>India's most abundant resource is its people and through the rest of this century, it will remain the world's largest country by population. Yet it has done a singularly poor job in substantially improving its human capital, evident in poor learning outcomes at all stages of education and high morbidity rates.</p><p>Despite rapid growth, structural transformation been tepid, a consequence of entrenched problems rooted in the country's political economy. Many of these—agriculture, urbanization, electricity, water, education, health, environment—require coordinated actions by both the central and state governments. But the manner in which India's political economy has been evolving, with greater centralization at both the federal and subnational levels, have weakened the institutional mechanisms to bring this about.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":45430,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asian Economic Policy Review\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"97-99\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-08-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/aepr.12490\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asian Economic Policy Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aepr.12490\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian Economic Policy Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aepr.12490","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

Panagariya(2025)对印度经济的表现和政策进行了令人信服的总结,并对印度的未来前景进行了乐观的预测,尽管存在一些持久的挑战。这些评论集中在论文中强调的三个问题上,从社会主义到国家主义的持续与变化,以及未来的前景,特别关注过去的四分之一个世纪。人们普遍认为,1991年是印度经济政策的一个决定性转折点。然而,随后,特别是1998年瓦杰帕伊领导的全国民主联盟(NDA)政府上台后,虽然每届新政府都提出了新的计划和项目,但经济政策的变化却更加渐进。事实上,即使是许多项目也看到了连续性,尽管变化的速度各不相同。因此,瓦杰帕伊领导的全国民主联盟政府启动了一项全国农村公路和高速公路建设计划,该计划在接下来的十年中不断扩大。事实上,许多公共项目,如住房、村庄电气化、饮用水和卫生设施,已经存在了几十年,但进展缓慢。在莫迪政府的领导下,改变的是全民医保的雄心壮志和快速实施的步伐。同样,团结进步联盟(UPA)政府推出了全国农村就业保障计划(NREGS)。尽管当时受到了很多批评,但该项目在其继任者NDA政府的领导下继续进行,除了在疫情期间提供安全网外,还对农村工资和贫困产生了巨大的正外部性。这种连续性也反映在莫迪政府的两大成就上——数字公共基础设施(DPI)和商品及服务税(GST)。dpi的基础——通用生物识别ID, Aadhaar,以及gst的知识基础都是由前任政府发起的。事实上,在过去的四分之一世纪里,印度经济增长的特点是连续性而不是断续性,这在不同的政府之间并没有特别的不同(在2000年后的第一个十年里可能是最强劲的)。在政策方面,尽管迄今为止被视为禁忌的广泛领域(包括国防)已经稳步自由化,但现在长期的高财政赤字既象征着根深蒂固的政治经济,也象征着顽固的国家干预主义,这是印度国家的DNA,无论哪届政府执政。2004年和2013年(分别是瓦杰帕伊和曼莫汉·辛格政府的最后几年),一般政府最终消费支出占国内生产总值(GDP)的比例分别为10.4%和10.3%,2022年为10.3%。在同一时期,中央公共部门企业(cpse)的资本从5万亿卢比扩大到17.7万亿卢比,然后是38.2万亿卢比。2023年,印度最大的10家公司(按市值计算)中有6家是cpse。在2014/2015和2020/2021之间,政府注入了3.37万亿卢比(超过500亿美元)来支撑公共部门银行的资产负债表。虽然团结进步联盟政府阻止了瓦杰帕伊政府发起的私有化,但莫迪领导的全国皿煮联盟也取得了不温不热的进展。如果我们再加上产业政策的复兴、更多的干预主义贸易政策和监管的不可预测性,国家主义将继续在印度蓬勃发展。地方性的统计主义及其成本在农业中更为明显,即使在今天,农业仍然是劳动力的最大一部分。在过去的三十年里,政府干预较少的农业部门——园艺和牲畜(它们也更有营养)——增长得更快,在印度人的饮食中所占的份额也越来越大。然而,印度的公共政策——包括所有政府——一直沉迷于主要谷物(小麦和大米),尽管它们在家庭消费中的份额一直在下降,生态破坏也在加剧,但它们在投入和产出方面都得到了大量补贴。Panagariya对印度的增长前景有些乐观。跨国公司都在为“中国+1”战略做准备,印度应该是合乎逻辑的首选。虽然发生了一些变化,但越南等较小的经济体做得好得多,过去几年流入印度的外国直接投资(FDI)大幅下降。与此同时,在过去十年中,国内私人投资(占GDP的比例)也有所下降,与预期相反,基础设施公共投资的大幅增加并没有“挤入”私人投资。不断变暗的地缘政治阴云可能使出口短路,而出口一直是印度经济增长的重要引擎。印度不是将其纳入全球供应链的关键自由贸易协定(fta)的一部分。它在应对气候变化带来的中长期不确定性方面的能力也很差。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Comment on “Indian Economy: Performance, Policies, Politics, and Prospects and Challenges”

Panagariya (2025) provides a cogent summary of the performance of India's economy and the policies that shaped them and concludes with an optimist prognosis of India's future prospects despite some enduring challenges. These comments focus on three issues highlighted in the paper, continuing versus change, from socialism to statism, and future prospects, focusing particularly on the past quarter century.

There is broad agreement that 1991 was a decisive break point in Indian economic policy. Subsequently, however, and especially after 1998 when the Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government came to power, while each new government advanced new programs and projects, changes in economic policies writ large, have been more incremental. Indeed even many programs have seen continuity although the pace of change has varied. Thus, the Vajpayee-led NDA government launched a countrywide rural roads and highway construction program, which expanded over the next decade under successive governments. Indeed many public programs, be it housing, village electrification, drinking water, and sanitation, have been in existence for decades, but progress was lethargic. What changed under the Modi government was the ambition—universal coverage—and the rapid pace of implementation.

Similarly, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government launched the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS). While much critiqued at the time, the program continued under its successor NDA government and had large positive externalities on rural wages and poverty, besides providing a safety net during the COVID years.

The continuity is also reflected in two major achievements of the Modi government—digital public infrastructure (DPI) and Goods and Services Tax (GST). The foundation of DPI—the universal biometric ID, Aadhaar, as well as the intellectual groundwork of the GST—were initiated by the predecessor government. Indeed continuity rather than disjuncture has also been the hallmark of India's economic growth in the past quarter century, which has not been especially different across different governments (and was probably strongest in the first post-2000 decade).

On policies, while there has been steady liberalization in a wide range of sectors that were hitherto taboo (including defense), the now chronic high fiscal deficits are emblematic of both an entrenched political economy and a tenacious dirigisme that is the DNA of the Indian state, no matter which government is in power. General government final consumption expenditure as percent of gross domestic product (GDP) was 10.4% in 2004 and 10.3% in 2013 (the last years of the Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh government's, respectively) and 10.3% in 2022. Capital employed in central public sector enterprises (CPSEs) expanded from ₹5 trillion to ₹17.7 trillion and then ₹38.2 trillion over the same period. Six of 10 largest Indian companies (by market cap) in 2023 were CPSEs. Between 2014/2015 and 2020/2021, the government infused ₹3.37 trillion (more than $50 billion) to shore up the balance sheets of public sector banks. While the UPA government stopped privatization initiated by the Vajpayee government, progress under the Modi-led NDA has also been tepid. If we add to this mix the revival of industrial policy, more interventionist trade policies, and regulatory unpredictability, statism continues to thrive in India.

The endemic statism—and its costs—are even more evident in agriculture, which even today employs the largest fraction of the labor force. Over the past three decades agriculture sectors which have less government intervention—horticulture and livestock (which are also more nutritious)—have grown substantially faster with a growing share in Indian diets. Yet public policy in India—across all governments—has been obsessed with the principal cereals (wheat and rice), which are lavished with subsidies, both on a range of inputs as well as outputs, even as their share in household consumption has been declining and mounting ecological damage.

Panagariya is somewhat sanguine about the India's growth prospects. As multinational corporations geared for a China+1 strategy, India should have been the logical top option. While some shift has occurred, smaller economies like Vietnam have done much better, with foreign direct investment (FDI) into India declining substantially in the last few years. Concurrently, domestic private investment has also declined (as share of GDP) in the last decade and, contrary to expectations, the large increase in public investment in infrastructure has not “crowded in” private investment.

Darkening geopolitical clouds can short-circuit exports, which have been an important engine of India's growth. India is not part key free trade agreements (FTAs) that would include it in global supply chains. It is also poorly equipped to cope with the medium- to long-term uncertainties due to climate changes.

India's most abundant resource is its people and through the rest of this century, it will remain the world's largest country by population. Yet it has done a singularly poor job in substantially improving its human capital, evident in poor learning outcomes at all stages of education and high morbidity rates.

Despite rapid growth, structural transformation been tepid, a consequence of entrenched problems rooted in the country's political economy. Many of these—agriculture, urbanization, electricity, water, education, health, environment—require coordinated actions by both the central and state governments. But the manner in which India's political economy has been evolving, with greater centralization at both the federal and subnational levels, have weakened the institutional mechanisms to bring this about.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
12.90
自引率
2.60%
发文量
39
期刊介绍: The goal of the Asian Economic Policy Review is to become an intellectual voice on the current issues of international economics and economic policy, based on comprehensive and in-depth analyses, with a primary focus on Asia. Emphasis is placed on identifying key issues at the time - spanning international trade, international finance, the environment, energy, the integration of regional economies and other issues - in order to furnish ideas and proposals to contribute positively to the policy debate in the region.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信