交叉所有制、绿色管理授权和排放税

IF 2.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Managerial and Decision Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-09 DOI:10.1002/mde.4428

Xubei Lian, Leonard F. S. Wang, Kai Zhang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了具有排放税政策的古诺双寡头市场中交叉所有权对绿色管理委托合同的影响。我们发现，即使有绿色管理授权，较高的交叉所有权也会加剧环境退化并减少社会福利。与销售授权相比，这种所有权下的绿色管理授权往往产生更高的环境破坏和更低的社会福利。与并行监管相比，非承诺排放税往往导致更低的环境破坏和更高的社会福利，尽管后者不会选择绿色管理授权。我们的研究结果具有重要的政策意义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Cross-Ownership, Green Managerial Delegation, and Emission Taxation

This paper analyzes the effects of cross-ownership on green managerial delegation contracts in a Cournot duopoly market with emission tax policy. We show that higher cross-ownership will always exacerbate environmental degradation and diminish societal welfare, even with green managerial delegation. Compared with sales delegation, green managerial delegation under such ownership always yields higher environmental damage and lower social welfare. Compared to concurrent regulation, noncommitted emission taxation always leads to lower environmental damage and higher social welfare, although green managerial delegation will not be chosen in the latter. Our findings have important policy implications.

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来源期刊

Managerial and Decision Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

18.20%

发文量

242

期刊介绍： Managerial and Decision Economics will publish articles applying economic reasoning to managerial decision-making and management strategy.Management strategy concerns practical decisions that managers face about how to compete, how to succeed, and how to organize to achieve their goals. Economic thinking and analysis provides a critical foundation for strategic decision-making across a variety of dimensions. For example, economic insights may help in determining which activities to outsource and which to perfom internally. They can help unravel questions regarding what drives performance differences among firms and what allows these differences to persist. They can contribute to an appreciation of how industries, organizations, and capabilities evolve.