零和思维的政治经济学

IF 6.6 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Econometrica Pub Date : 2025-02-03 DOI:10.3982/ECTA22474

S. Nageeb Ali, Maximilian Mihm, Lucas Siga

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文为选举中的零和思维提供了一个战略依据。我们表明，信息不对称和分配考虑共同使选民对其他人支持的政策保持警惕。这种力量迫使大多数选民支持与他们的偏好和信息相反的政策。我们的分析确定并解释了一种“反向相关”的形式，这种形式对于零和思维在平衡中占上风是必要和充分的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Political Economy of Zero-Sum Thinking

This paper offers a strategic rationale for zero-sum thinking in elections. We show that asymmetric information and distributional considerations together make voters wary of policies supported by others. This force impels a majority of voters to support policies contrary to their preferences and information. Our analysis identifies and interprets a form of “adverse correlation” that is necessary and sufficient for zero-sum thinking to prevail in equilibrium.

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来源期刊

Econometrica 社会科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

11.00

自引率

3.30%

发文量

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： Econometrica publishes original articles in all branches of economics - theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage across the subject area. It promotes studies that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics each year - from the frontier of theoretical developments in many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in econometrics. Econometrica maintains a long tradition that submitted articles are refereed carefully and that detailed and thoughtful referee reports are provided to the author as an aid to scientific research, thus ensuring the high calibre of papers found in Econometrica. An international board of editors, together with the referees it has selected, has succeeded in substantially reducing editorial turnaround time, thereby encouraging submissions of the highest quality. We strongly encourage recent Ph. D. graduates to submit their work to Econometrica. Our policy is to take into account the fact that recent graduates are less experienced in the process of writing and submitting papers.