中央邦转移支付的政治决定因素:印度各邦的实证分析

Deepti Kohli
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文关注的是印度政府间转移支付的政治方面。通过使用一个平衡的面板数据集,包括28个印度邦和联邦领土2003-2023年期间的立法议会和邦一级议会选举的数据,目的是调查中央政府是否出于政治动机向印度邦分配财政资源?这项分析是针对中央政府的三种转移支付方式进行的:贷款、拨款和税收下放。回归估计包括各种政治控制,如政党之间的选举竞争、选民参与率、政府的意识形态倾向、中央州的党派关系、政府任职和对政治游说的控制。本研究的结果揭示了各种政治力量对印度不同类别的政府间转移支付的重大影响。例如,更激烈的政治竞争导致补助金减少,税收下放增加,中央政府提供的贷款与邦的GDP成比例。研究发现,左倾的政府意识形态会导致中央政府拨款占该州GDP的比例增加。此外,中央和州政府之间更大的党派关系导致向该州提供的拨款和税收下放的平均比例增加。最后,在一个州,向获胜政党提供的政治捐款增加,会导致中央政府向该邦提供的贷款和拨款增加,同时税收权力下放受到抑制。所有这些结果确实提供了一些支持选举机会主义和游说在印度各邦财政资源分配中的作用的证据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Political determinants of centre-state transfers: An empirical analysis across Indian states
This paper focuses on the political aspect of intergovernmental transfers in India. By using a balanced panel data-set comprising of data on 28 Indian states and Union Territories for the period 2003–2023 for both Legislative Assembly and Parliamentary elections at the state-level, the aim is to investigate whether there occurs a politically motivated distribution of financial resources by the central government to the states in India? The analysis has been done for three categories of centre-state transfers: loans, grants and tax devolution. The regression estimations include various political controls such as, electoral competition between political parties, voter participation rate, government’s ideological leaning, centre-state partisan affiliation, government incumbency and a control for political lobbying. The findings of this study reveal a significant influence of various political forces on different categories of intergovernmental transfers in India. For instance, a greater political competition leads to a lowering of grants and a rise in tax devolution and loans provided by the central government in proportion to the state’s GDP. A left-leaning government ideology is found to entail an increase in the proportion of grants from the centre in proportion to the state’s GDP. In addition, a greater partisan affiliation between the central and state governments leads to an increase in the average proportion of grants and tax devolution provided to that state. Finally, an increase in the political contributions provided to the winning party in a state leads to a rise in the provision of loans and grants by the centre to that state, while tax devolution is dampened. All these results do provide some evidence in favour of electoral opportunism and lobbying at work in the distribution of financial resources across Indian states.
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