寡头垄断市场中的金融与勾结

IF 3.8 3区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

North American Journal of Economics and Finance Pub Date : 2025-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.najef.2024.102351

Sugata Marjit , Arijit Mukherjee , Xinpeng Xu , Lei Yang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们探讨了金融约束如何影响银行融资寡头垄断中产品市场合谋的可持续性，其中企业在不完善的信贷市场中运作。我们的分析揭示了合谋的可持续性与金融约束水平之间的非单调关系，使用一般需求函数。值得注意的是，当企业经历低到中等程度的财务约束时，与完全没有财务约束相比，合谋往往更可持续。然而，当企业处于完全的财务约束时，与没有财务约束的情况相比，合谋的可持续性可能会降低。这些发现适用于古诺和贝特朗在产品市场上的竞争模型。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Finance and collusion in oligopolistic markets

We explore how financial constraints affect the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank-financed oligopoly, where firms operate within an imperfect credit market. Our analysis uncovers a non-monotonic relationship between the sustainability of collusion and the level of financial constraints, using a general demand function. Notably, collusion tends to be more sustainable when firms experience low to moderate financial constraints, as opposed to having no financial constraints at all. However, when firms are under complete financial constraints, the sustainability of collusion may decrease compared to situations without financial constraints. These findings hold true for both Cournot and Bertrand competition models in the product market.

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来源期刊

North American Journal of Economics and Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

7.30

自引率

8.30%

发文量

168

期刊介绍： The focus of the North-American Journal of Economics and Finance is on the economics of integration of goods, services, financial markets, at both regional and global levels with the role of economic policy in that process playing an important role. Both theoretical and empirical papers are welcome. Empirical and policy-related papers that rely on data and the experiences of countries outside North America are also welcome. Papers should offer concrete lessons about the ongoing process of globalization, or policy implications about how governments, domestic or international institutions, can improve the coordination of their activities. Empirical analysis should be capable of replication. Authors of accepted papers will be encouraged to supply data and computer programs.