ESG：市场力量的灵丹妙药？

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-24 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103991

Philip Bond, Doron Levit

{"title":"ESG：市场力量的灵丹妙药？","authors":"Philip Bond, Doron Levit","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103991","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We study the equilibrium effects of the “S” dimension of ESG under imperfect competition. ESG policies are pledges made by firms that constrain managers to treat their stakeholders better than market conditions alone dictate. Moderate policies limit market power and prompt managers to be more competitive; aggressive polices backfire, both for adopting firms and intended beneficiaries. In contrast to the “shareholder primacy” paradigm, competition in ESG policies under the “stakeholder capitalism” paradigm is a panacea for market power, delivering the first-best outcome in equilibrium. We discuss drivers behind the recent rise in ESG, ESG-linked compensation, and disclosure practices.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"165 ","pages":"Article 103991"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ESG: A panacea for market power?\",\"authors\":\"Philip Bond, Doron Levit\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103991\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We study the equilibrium effects of the “S” dimension of ESG under imperfect competition. ESG policies are pledges made by firms that constrain managers to treat their stakeholders better than market conditions alone dictate. Moderate policies limit market power and prompt managers to be more competitive; aggressive polices backfire, both for adopting firms and intended beneficiaries. In contrast to the “shareholder primacy” paradigm, competition in ESG policies under the “stakeholder capitalism” paradigm is a panacea for market power, delivering the first-best outcome in equilibrium. We discuss drivers behind the recent rise in ESG, ESG-linked compensation, and disclosure practices.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51346,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Financial Economics\",\"volume\":\"165 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103991\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":10.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-01-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Financial Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24002149\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24002149","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

研究了不完全竞争条件下ESG“S”维度的均衡效应。ESG政策是企业做出的承诺，它约束管理者更好地对待利益相关者，而不仅仅是市场条件所要求的。适度的政策限制了市场力量，促使管理者更具竞争力；激进的政策适得其反，对收养公司和预期受益人都是如此。与“股东至上”范式相反，“利益相关者资本主义”范式下的ESG政策竞争是市场力量的灵丹妙药，在均衡中提供最佳结果。我们将讨论最近ESG、与ESG相关的薪酬和信息披露实践兴起背后的驱动因素。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

ESG: A panacea for market power?

We study the equilibrium effects of the “S” dimension of ESG under imperfect competition. ESG policies are pledges made by firms that constrain managers to treat their stakeholders better than market conditions alone dictate. Moderate policies limit market power and prompt managers to be more competitive; aggressive polices backfire, both for adopting firms and intended beneficiaries. In contrast to the “shareholder primacy” paradigm, competition in ESG policies under the “stakeholder capitalism” paradigm is a panacea for market power, delivering the first-best outcome in equilibrium. We discuss drivers behind the recent rise in ESG, ESG-linked compensation, and disclosure practices.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.