最佳流动性不足

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-01-18 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.103996

John Beshears , James J. Choi , Christopher Clayton , Christopher Harris , David Laibson , Brigitte C. Madrian

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了一个经济中社会最优的非流动性水平，这个经济中有品味冲击的家庭，并以天真的信念呈现偏见。政府选择强制性供款账户，每个账户都有不同的退休前提款罚款。已收取的罚金全部退还。当家庭具有均匀的当前偏差β时，社会最优值可以很好地近似于单个账户的提前提款惩罚为1 - β。当家庭存在异质性当前偏差时，两账户系统很好地近似于社会最优：(i)完全流动的账户和（ii）退休前完全不流动的账户。

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Optimal illiquidity

We study the socially optimal level of illiquidity in an economy populated by households with taste shocks and present bias with naive beliefs. The government chooses mandatory contributions to accounts, each with a different pre-retirement withdrawal penalty. Collected penalties are rebated lump sum. When households have homogeneous present bias,

β

, the social optimum is well approximated by a single account with an early-withdrawal penalty of

1 - β

. When households have heterogeneous present bias, the social optimum is well approximated by a two-account system: (i) an account that is completely liquid and (ii) an account that is completely illiquid until retirement.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.