波长切换攻击下光锁相环双场量子密钥分配的实际安全性

IF 6.6 1区 物理与天体物理 Q1 PHYSICS, APPLIED
Qingquan Peng, Jiu-Peng Chen, Tianyi Xing, Dongyang Wang, Yizhi Wang, Yang Liu, Anqi Huang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

双场类量子密钥分发(tf类QKD)已经通过实验证明了在不需要量子中继器的情况下超越基本速率距离限制的能力,这是一个革命性的里程碑。在tf级QKD实现中,通常采用光锁相环(OPLL)结构来产生具有相关相位的参考光,以确保Alice和Bob之间光场的相干性。在这种配置中,参考光通常位于不可信站Charlie中,仅为OPLL提供波长参考,不参与量子态编码。然而,参考光可能会为夏娃打开一扇门,让她进入本应受到良好保护的源站。在这里,通过识别OPLL方案中声光调制器(AOM)的漏洞,我们提出并演示了对tf级QKD系统的波长切换攻击。这种攻击涉及Eve故意操纵参考光的波长,以增加制备的量子态的平均光子数,同时保持tf级QKD协议要求的Alice和Bob之间的稳定干涉。观测到的最大平均光子数增加为8.7%,这在理论上已被证明会危及tf级QKD系统的安全性。此外,我们已经证明,通过对调制器进行良好的校准,可以消除攻击。通过本研究,我们强调了系统校准在tf级QKD实现中实际安全中的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Practical security of twin-field quantum key distribution with optical phase-locked loop under wavelength-switching attack

Practical security of twin-field quantum key distribution with optical phase-locked loop under wavelength-switching attack

The twin-field class quantum key distribution (TF-class QKD) has experimentally demonstrated the ability to surpass the fundamental rate-distance limit without requiring a quantum repeater, as a revolutional milestone. In TF-class QKD implementation, an optical phase-locked loop (OPLL) structure is commonly employed to generate a reference light with correlated phase, ensuring coherence of optical fields between Alice and Bob. In this configuration, the reference light, typically located in the untrusted station Charlie, solely provides wavelength reference for OPLL and does not participate in quantum-state encoding. However, the reference light may open a door for Eve to enter the source stations that are supposed to be well protected. Here, by identifying vulnerabilities of an acousto-optic modulator (AOM) in the OPLL scheme, we propose and demonstrate a wavelength-switching attack on a TF-class QKD system. This attack involves Eve deliberately manipulating the wavelength of the reference light to increase mean photon number of prepared quantum states, while maintaining stable interference between Alice and Bob as required by TF-class QKD protocols. The maximum observed increase in mean photon number is 8.7%, which has been theoretically proven to compromise the security of a TF-class QKD system. Moreover, we have shown that with well calibration of the modulators, the attack can be eliminated. Through this study, we highlight the importance of system calibration in the practical security in TF-class QKD implementation.

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来源期刊
npj Quantum Information
npj Quantum Information Computer Science-Computer Science (miscellaneous)
CiteScore
13.70
自引率
3.90%
发文量
130
审稿时长
29 weeks
期刊介绍: The scope of npj Quantum Information spans across all relevant disciplines, fields, approaches and levels and so considers outstanding work ranging from fundamental research to applications and technologies.
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