{"title":"利用FDA和RIS的方向范围聚焦提高保密率","authors":"Chu Li;Stefan Roth;Aydin Sezgin","doi":"10.1109/TVT.2025.3530497","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One of the great potentials to improve the confidentiality in mmWave/THz at the physical layer of technical communication, measured by the secrecy rate, lies in the use of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs). However, an important open problem arises when the eavesdropper is aligned with the legitimate user or near the RIS or legitimate user. The limitation stems from the high directional gain caused by the dominant line-of-sight (LOS) path in high-frequency transmission and the high energy leakage in the proximity of the RIS and the legitimate user. To address these issues, we employ frequency diverse arrays (FDA) at the base station (BS) associated with random inverted transmit beamforming and reflective element subset selection (RIBES). More specifically, we consider a passive eavesdropper with unknown location and design the transmit beamforming and RIS configuration based on the channel information of the legitimate user only. In this context, the secrecy rate with the proposed transmission technique is evaluated in the case of deterministic eavesdropper channel, demonstrating that we can ensure a secure transmission regarding both direction and range. Furthermore, assuming no prior information about the eavesdropper, we describe the wiretap region and derive the <italic>worst-case secrecy rate</i> in closed form. The latter is further optimized by determining the optimal subset sizes of the transmit antennas and reflective elements. Simulations validate the closed-form expressions and demonstrate that we can effectively improve the secrecy rate, especially when the eavesdropper is near the RIS or the legitimate user.","PeriodicalId":13421,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology","volume":"74 5","pages":"7835-7849"},"PeriodicalIF":7.1000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Enhancing the Secrecy Rate With Direction-Range Focusing With FDA and RIS\",\"authors\":\"Chu Li;Stefan Roth;Aydin Sezgin\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/TVT.2025.3530497\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"One of the great potentials to improve the confidentiality in mmWave/THz at the physical layer of technical communication, measured by the secrecy rate, lies in the use of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs). However, an important open problem arises when the eavesdropper is aligned with the legitimate user or near the RIS or legitimate user. The limitation stems from the high directional gain caused by the dominant line-of-sight (LOS) path in high-frequency transmission and the high energy leakage in the proximity of the RIS and the legitimate user. To address these issues, we employ frequency diverse arrays (FDA) at the base station (BS) associated with random inverted transmit beamforming and reflective element subset selection (RIBES). More specifically, we consider a passive eavesdropper with unknown location and design the transmit beamforming and RIS configuration based on the channel information of the legitimate user only. In this context, the secrecy rate with the proposed transmission technique is evaluated in the case of deterministic eavesdropper channel, demonstrating that we can ensure a secure transmission regarding both direction and range. Furthermore, assuming no prior information about the eavesdropper, we describe the wiretap region and derive the <italic>worst-case secrecy rate</i> in closed form. The latter is further optimized by determining the optimal subset sizes of the transmit antennas and reflective elements. Simulations validate the closed-form expressions and demonstrate that we can effectively improve the secrecy rate, especially when the eavesdropper is near the RIS or the legitimate user.\",\"PeriodicalId\":13421,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology\",\"volume\":\"74 5\",\"pages\":\"7835-7849\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-01-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10843324/\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10843324/","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC","Score":null,"Total":0}
Enhancing the Secrecy Rate With Direction-Range Focusing With FDA and RIS
One of the great potentials to improve the confidentiality in mmWave/THz at the physical layer of technical communication, measured by the secrecy rate, lies in the use of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs). However, an important open problem arises when the eavesdropper is aligned with the legitimate user or near the RIS or legitimate user. The limitation stems from the high directional gain caused by the dominant line-of-sight (LOS) path in high-frequency transmission and the high energy leakage in the proximity of the RIS and the legitimate user. To address these issues, we employ frequency diverse arrays (FDA) at the base station (BS) associated with random inverted transmit beamforming and reflective element subset selection (RIBES). More specifically, we consider a passive eavesdropper with unknown location and design the transmit beamforming and RIS configuration based on the channel information of the legitimate user only. In this context, the secrecy rate with the proposed transmission technique is evaluated in the case of deterministic eavesdropper channel, demonstrating that we can ensure a secure transmission regarding both direction and range. Furthermore, assuming no prior information about the eavesdropper, we describe the wiretap region and derive the worst-case secrecy rate in closed form. The latter is further optimized by determining the optimal subset sizes of the transmit antennas and reflective elements. Simulations validate the closed-form expressions and demonstrate that we can effectively improve the secrecy rate, especially when the eavesdropper is near the RIS or the legitimate user.
期刊介绍:
The scope of the Transactions is threefold (which was approved by the IEEE Periodicals Committee in 1967) and is published on the journal website as follows: Communications: The use of mobile radio on land, sea, and air, including cellular radio, two-way radio, and one-way radio, with applications to dispatch and control vehicles, mobile radiotelephone, radio paging, and status monitoring and reporting. Related areas include spectrum usage, component radio equipment such as cavities and antennas, compute control for radio systems, digital modulation and transmission techniques, mobile radio circuit design, radio propagation for vehicular communications, effects of ignition noise and radio frequency interference, and consideration of the vehicle as part of the radio operating environment. Transportation Systems: The use of electronic technology for the control of ground transportation systems including, but not limited to, traffic aid systems; traffic control systems; automatic vehicle identification, location, and monitoring systems; automated transport systems, with single and multiple vehicle control; and moving walkways or people-movers. Vehicular Electronics: The use of electronic or electrical components and systems for control, propulsion, or auxiliary functions, including but not limited to, electronic controls for engineer, drive train, convenience, safety, and other vehicle systems; sensors, actuators, and microprocessors for onboard use; electronic fuel control systems; vehicle electrical components and systems collision avoidance systems; electromagnetic compatibility in the vehicle environment; and electric vehicles and controls.