服务提供者与需求者之间低碳合作的共同演化分析

IF 10 1区 环境科学与生态学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ENVIRONMENTAL
Tiaojuan Han, Jianfeng Lu, Hao Zhang, Kaiyu Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了实现“双碳”目标,云平台激发了云制造供应商和需求方之间的低碳合作。运用进化博弈论和复杂网络理论,构建了供需双方低碳合作的协同进化博弈模型。利用费米规则和愿望驱动规则描述双方对低碳战略的学习过程。数值分析比较了不同策略更新规则对供给方和需求方低碳战略演进的影响。此外,还分析了平台激励和环境噪声水平的影响。结果表明:考虑节点度的费米规则和更新期望水平的愿望驱动规则使供需双方更倾向于进行低碳合作。随着碳交易价格和绿色补贴的增加,供应商更有可能选择低碳合作。低碳消费补贴正向影响需求方的合作。相反,环境噪音水平对供应商的合作产生负面影响。与自进化模式相比,共同进化模式鼓励双方更积极地参与低碳合作。总体而言,该研究为云平台提供了有价值的见解和决策建议。这些建议旨在加强该平台在促进供应商和需求方之间低碳合作方面的作用,从而为实现“双碳”目标做出贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Co-evolution analysis of low-carbon cooperation between service providers and demanders
To achieve the “double carbon” goal, the cloud platform has stimulated low-carbon cooperation among providers and demanders in cloud manufacturing. A co-evolutionary game model of low-carbon cooperation for providers and demanders is constructed using evolutionary game theory and complex network theory. The Fermi rule and Aspiration-driven rule are utilized to describe the learning process of low-carbon strategies for both parties. Numerical analysis compares the impacts of different strategy update rules on the evolution of low-carbon strategies for providers and demanders. Furthermore, the impacts of platform incentives and environmental noise levels are analyzed. The results indicated that providers and demanders are inclined to engage in low-carbon cooperation through the Fermi rule considering the node degree and the Aspiration-driven rule, which updates aspiration levels. As carbon trading prices and green subsidies increase, providers are more likely to opt for low-carbon cooperation. Low-carbon consumption subsidies positively affect demanders’ cooperation. Conversely, environmental noise levels negatively influence providers’ cooperation. Compared to self-evolution mode, co-evolution mode encourages both sides to participate more actively in low-carbon cooperation. Overall, the study provides valuable insights and decision-making suggestions for the cloud platform. These suggestions aim to enhance the platform’s role in promoting low-carbon cooperation among providers and demanders, thereby contributing to the ‘double carbon’ goal.
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来源期刊
Journal of Cleaner Production
Journal of Cleaner Production 环境科学-工程:环境
CiteScore
20.40
自引率
9.00%
发文量
4720
审稿时长
111 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Cleaner Production is an international, transdisciplinary journal that addresses and discusses theoretical and practical Cleaner Production, Environmental, and Sustainability issues. It aims to help societies become more sustainable by focusing on the concept of 'Cleaner Production', which aims at preventing waste production and increasing efficiencies in energy, water, resources, and human capital use. The journal serves as a platform for corporations, governments, education institutions, regions, and societies to engage in discussions and research related to Cleaner Production, environmental, and sustainability practices.
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