{"title":"减值论的意外之喜。","authors":"Braylen Samuel","doi":"10.1111/bioe.13394","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to Hendricks Impairment Argument (IA), abortion is immoral because it impairs the fetus. Here, I argue it is not sufficient to show merely that abortion impairs, Hendricks must show that it harms the fetus. If the fetus is not numerically identical to the person it will become, then it isn't harmed by an abortion. But if the fetus is numerically identical to the person it will become, it is harmed by the deprivation of a future of value. However, taking this route ultimately undermines the novelty of the impairment argument.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Impairment Argument's Coup de Grâce.\",\"authors\":\"Braylen Samuel\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/bioe.13394\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>According to Hendricks Impairment Argument (IA), abortion is immoral because it impairs the fetus. Here, I argue it is not sufficient to show merely that abortion impairs, Hendricks must show that it harms the fetus. If the fetus is not numerically identical to the person it will become, then it isn't harmed by an abortion. But if the fetus is numerically identical to the person it will become, it is harmed by the deprivation of a future of value. However, taking this route ultimately undermines the novelty of the impairment argument.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":55379,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Bioethics\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-01-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Bioethics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13394\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Bioethics","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13394","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
According to Hendricks Impairment Argument (IA), abortion is immoral because it impairs the fetus. Here, I argue it is not sufficient to show merely that abortion impairs, Hendricks must show that it harms the fetus. If the fetus is not numerically identical to the person it will become, then it isn't harmed by an abortion. But if the fetus is numerically identical to the person it will become, it is harmed by the deprivation of a future of value. However, taking this route ultimately undermines the novelty of the impairment argument.
期刊介绍:
As medical technology continues to develop, the subject of bioethics has an ever increasing practical relevance for all those working in philosophy, medicine, law, sociology, public policy, education and related fields.
Bioethics provides a forum for well-argued articles on the ethical questions raised by current issues such as: international collaborative clinical research in developing countries; public health; infectious disease; AIDS; managed care; genomics and stem cell research. These questions are considered in relation to concrete ethical, legal and policy problems, or in terms of the fundamental concepts, principles and theories used in discussions of such problems.
Bioethics also features regular Background Briefings on important current debates in the field. These feature articles provide excellent material for bioethics scholars, teachers and students alike.