Rudy Purkart , Maël Delem , Virginie Ranson , Charlotte Andrey , Rémy Versace , Eddy Cavalli , Gaën Plancher
{"title":"在幻像症中是否存在无意识的视觉形象?内隐启动范式的发展。","authors":"Rudy Purkart , Maël Delem , Virginie Ranson , Charlotte Andrey , Rémy Versace , Eddy Cavalli , Gaën Plancher","doi":"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.106059","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>For some people the experience of visual imagery is lacking, a condition recently referred to as aphantasia. So far, most of the studies on aphantasia rely on subjective reports, leaving the question of whether mental images can exist without reaching consciousness unresolved. In the present study, the formation of mental images was estimated in individuals with aphantasia without explicitly asking them to generate mental images. 151 Participants performed an implicit priming task where a probe is assumed to automatically reactivate a mental image. An explicit priming task, where participants were explicitly required to form a mental image after a probe, served as a control task. While control participants showed a priming effect in both the implicit and explicit tasks, aphantasics did not show any priming effects. These results suggest that aphantasia relies on a genuine inability to generate mental images rather than on a deficit in accessing these images consciously. Our priming paradigm might be a promising tool for characterizing mental images without relying on participant introspection.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48455,"journal":{"name":"Cognition","volume":"256 ","pages":"Article 106059"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Are there unconscious visual images in aphantasia? Development of an implicit priming paradigm\",\"authors\":\"Rudy Purkart , Maël Delem , Virginie Ranson , Charlotte Andrey , Rémy Versace , Eddy Cavalli , Gaën Plancher\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.cognition.2024.106059\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>For some people the experience of visual imagery is lacking, a condition recently referred to as aphantasia. So far, most of the studies on aphantasia rely on subjective reports, leaving the question of whether mental images can exist without reaching consciousness unresolved. In the present study, the formation of mental images was estimated in individuals with aphantasia without explicitly asking them to generate mental images. 151 Participants performed an implicit priming task where a probe is assumed to automatically reactivate a mental image. An explicit priming task, where participants were explicitly required to form a mental image after a probe, served as a control task. While control participants showed a priming effect in both the implicit and explicit tasks, aphantasics did not show any priming effects. These results suggest that aphantasia relies on a genuine inability to generate mental images rather than on a deficit in accessing these images consciously. Our priming paradigm might be a promising tool for characterizing mental images without relying on participant introspection.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48455,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Cognition\",\"volume\":\"256 \",\"pages\":\"Article 106059\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-01-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Cognition\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724003457\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cognition","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0010027724003457","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
Are there unconscious visual images in aphantasia? Development of an implicit priming paradigm
For some people the experience of visual imagery is lacking, a condition recently referred to as aphantasia. So far, most of the studies on aphantasia rely on subjective reports, leaving the question of whether mental images can exist without reaching consciousness unresolved. In the present study, the formation of mental images was estimated in individuals with aphantasia without explicitly asking them to generate mental images. 151 Participants performed an implicit priming task where a probe is assumed to automatically reactivate a mental image. An explicit priming task, where participants were explicitly required to form a mental image after a probe, served as a control task. While control participants showed a priming effect in both the implicit and explicit tasks, aphantasics did not show any priming effects. These results suggest that aphantasia relies on a genuine inability to generate mental images rather than on a deficit in accessing these images consciously. Our priming paradigm might be a promising tool for characterizing mental images without relying on participant introspection.
期刊介绍:
Cognition is an international journal that publishes theoretical and experimental papers on the study of the mind. It covers a wide variety of subjects concerning all the different aspects of cognition, ranging from biological and experimental studies to formal analysis. Contributions from the fields of psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, mathematics, ethology and philosophy are welcome in this journal provided that they have some bearing on the functioning of the mind. In addition, the journal serves as a forum for discussion of social and political aspects of cognitive science.