在幻像症中是否存在无意识的视觉形象?内隐启动范式的发展。

IF 2.8 1区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL
Rudy Purkart , Maël Delem , Virginie Ranson , Charlotte Andrey , Rémy Versace , Eddy Cavalli , Gaën Plancher
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引用次数: 0

摘要

对于一些人来说,缺乏视觉意象的体验,这种情况最近被称为幻觉。到目前为止,大多数关于幻觉的研究都依赖于主观报告,留下了一个问题,即心理图像是否可以在没有意识的情况下存在。在本研究中,在没有明确要求他们产生心理图像的情况下,估计了幻像症患者心理图像的形成。参与者执行了一个内隐启动任务,假设探针会自动重新激活一个心理图像。一项显性启动任务作为控制任务,参与者被明确要求在探测后形成一个心理图像。而对照组的参与者在内隐和外显任务中都表现出启动效应,而幻觉组则没有任何启动效应。这些结果表明,幻像症依赖于真正无法产生心理图像,而不是有意识地访问这些图像的缺陷。我们的启动范式可能是一个很有前途的工具,可以在不依赖于参与者内省的情况下描述心理图像。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Are there unconscious visual images in aphantasia? Development of an implicit priming paradigm
For some people the experience of visual imagery is lacking, a condition recently referred to as aphantasia. So far, most of the studies on aphantasia rely on subjective reports, leaving the question of whether mental images can exist without reaching consciousness unresolved. In the present study, the formation of mental images was estimated in individuals with aphantasia without explicitly asking them to generate mental images. 151 Participants performed an implicit priming task where a probe is assumed to automatically reactivate a mental image. An explicit priming task, where participants were explicitly required to form a mental image after a probe, served as a control task. While control participants showed a priming effect in both the implicit and explicit tasks, aphantasics did not show any priming effects. These results suggest that aphantasia relies on a genuine inability to generate mental images rather than on a deficit in accessing these images consciously. Our priming paradigm might be a promising tool for characterizing mental images without relying on participant introspection.
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来源期刊
Cognition
Cognition PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL-
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
5.90%
发文量
283
期刊介绍: Cognition is an international journal that publishes theoretical and experimental papers on the study of the mind. It covers a wide variety of subjects concerning all the different aspects of cognition, ranging from biological and experimental studies to formal analysis. Contributions from the fields of psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, mathematics, ethology and philosophy are welcome in this journal provided that they have some bearing on the functioning of the mind. In addition, the journal serves as a forum for discussion of social and political aspects of cognitive science.
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