Rewarding loyalty: Selective reassurance and enforcement of asymmetric alliances

Great powers frequently signal their alliance commitments during peacetime. While scholars see this peacetime practice as an integral part of great powers’ alliance maintenance, there is significant variation in the intensity of signals that junior allies receive. This article suggests that the choices made by great powers in signalling alliance commitments can be explained by the motivation to encourage compliance among junior allies. Great powers typically form alliances to exert control over their junior allies’ decision-making and thereby maintain their sphere of influence. Yet, great powers may face difficulty in making junior allies accommodate their demands as junior allies’ interests are not always in alignment. This article argues that great powers attempt to maintain their allies’ incentive to comply by reaffirming alliance commitments as an ex-post reward. In addition, to increase the efficiency of this reward strategy, great powers carefully select the targets, taking into account their allies’ willingness to make concessions. Empirical analysis using the sample of United States alliance relationships provides evidence that supports these arguments. This article contributes to the literature by deepening our comprehension of how great powers manage their alliances and providing at least a partial answer to how asymmetric alliances are maintained. Furthermore, this article has important implications for how great powers maintain their status within the international system.