战略性内幕交易及其对局外人的影响：来自18世纪的证据

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2025-02-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103974

Mathijs Cosemans , Rik Frehen

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用手工收集的历史数据，为内部人的战略性交易行为及其对外部人的影响提供了实证证据。具体来说，我们收集了在一个没有内幕交易法律限制的时代和一个交易是非匿名的市场中，所有内部人士和外部人士的所有股票交易。我们发现，私有信息的获取会导致内部人与外部人交易后收益的显著差异。与理论一致，内部人士通过隐藏身份和把握交易时机来利用他们的信息优势。由于这种战略性的内幕交易，经验丰富和经验不足的外部人士都面临着预期的损失。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Strategic insider trading and its consequences for outsiders: Evidence from the eighteenth century

This paper uses hand-collected historical data to provide empirical evidence on the strategic trading behavior of insiders and its consequences for outsiders. Specifically, we collect all equity trades of all insiders and outsiders in an era without legal restrictions on insider trading and a market where trading is non-anonymous. We find that access to private information creates a significant gap between the post-trade returns of insiders and outsiders. Consistent with theory, insiders capitalize on their information advantage by hiding their identity and timing their trades. Both experienced and inexperienced outsiders face expected losses due to this strategic insider trading.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.