危机时刻的信任和问责

IF 1.6 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Economica Pub Date : 2024-10-17 DOI:10.1111/ecca.12556
Monica Martinez-Bravo, Carlos Sanz
{"title":"危机时刻的信任和问责","authors":"Monica Martinez-Bravo,&nbsp;Carlos Sanz","doi":"10.1111/ecca.12556","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The COVID-19 pandemic took place against the backdrop of growing political polarization and distrust in institutions. Did deficiencies in government performance further erode trust? Did citizens' ideology interfere with how they processed information on government performance? To investigate, we conducted a pre-registered online experiment in Spain in November 2020. The treatment group was provided with information on the number of contact tracers in their region, a policy under the control of regional governments. We find that individuals greatly overestimate the number of contact tracers. When we provide the actual number, we find declines in trust in governments, willingness to fund public institutions, and COVID-19 vaccine acceptance. We also find that individuals endogenously change their attribution of responsibilities when receiving the treatment. In regions where the regional and central governments are ruled by different parties, sympathizers of the regional incumbent react to the negative news on performance by attributing greater responsibility to the central government. We call this the ‘blame-shifting effect’. In these regions, the negative information does not reduce voting intention for the regional incumbent government. These results suggest that political accountability may be particularly difficult in settings with high polarization and where areas of responsibility are not clearly delineated.</p>","PeriodicalId":48040,"journal":{"name":"Economica","volume":"92 365","pages":"230-258"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Trust and accountability in times of crisis\",\"authors\":\"Monica Martinez-Bravo,&nbsp;Carlos Sanz\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ecca.12556\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The COVID-19 pandemic took place against the backdrop of growing political polarization and distrust in institutions. Did deficiencies in government performance further erode trust? Did citizens' ideology interfere with how they processed information on government performance? To investigate, we conducted a pre-registered online experiment in Spain in November 2020. The treatment group was provided with information on the number of contact tracers in their region, a policy under the control of regional governments. We find that individuals greatly overestimate the number of contact tracers. When we provide the actual number, we find declines in trust in governments, willingness to fund public institutions, and COVID-19 vaccine acceptance. We also find that individuals endogenously change their attribution of responsibilities when receiving the treatment. In regions where the regional and central governments are ruled by different parties, sympathizers of the regional incumbent react to the negative news on performance by attributing greater responsibility to the central government. We call this the ‘blame-shifting effect’. In these regions, the negative information does not reduce voting intention for the regional incumbent government. These results suggest that political accountability may be particularly difficult in settings with high polarization and where areas of responsibility are not clearly delineated.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48040,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economica\",\"volume\":\"92 365\",\"pages\":\"230-258\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-10-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecca.12556\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economica","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecca.12556","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

COVID-19 大流行是在政治两极分化和对机构的不信任日益加剧的背景下发生的。政府绩效的缺陷是否进一步削弱了信任?公民的意识形态是否干扰了他们处理政府绩效信息的方式?为了进行调查,我们于 2020 年 11 月在西班牙进行了一次预先登记的在线实验。我们向处理组提供了本地区接触式追踪器数量的信息,这是一项由地区政府控制的政策。我们发现,个人大大高估了接触式追踪器的数量。当我们提供实际数量时,我们发现人们对政府的信任度、资助公共机构的意愿以及对 COVID-19 疫苗的接受度都有所下降。我们还发现,个人在接受治疗时会内生性地改变其责任归属。在地区政府和中央政府由不同党派执政的地区,地区执政者的同情者会对有关绩效的负面消息做出反应,将更大的责任归咎于中央政府。我们称之为 "责任转移效应"。在这些地区,负面信息并不会降低对地区现任政府的投票意向。这些结果表明,在两极分化严重、责任领域划分不清的情况下,政治问责可能尤其困难。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Trust and accountability in times of crisis

The COVID-19 pandemic took place against the backdrop of growing political polarization and distrust in institutions. Did deficiencies in government performance further erode trust? Did citizens' ideology interfere with how they processed information on government performance? To investigate, we conducted a pre-registered online experiment in Spain in November 2020. The treatment group was provided with information on the number of contact tracers in their region, a policy under the control of regional governments. We find that individuals greatly overestimate the number of contact tracers. When we provide the actual number, we find declines in trust in governments, willingness to fund public institutions, and COVID-19 vaccine acceptance. We also find that individuals endogenously change their attribution of responsibilities when receiving the treatment. In regions where the regional and central governments are ruled by different parties, sympathizers of the regional incumbent react to the negative news on performance by attributing greater responsibility to the central government. We call this the ‘blame-shifting effect’. In these regions, the negative information does not reduce voting intention for the regional incumbent government. These results suggest that political accountability may be particularly difficult in settings with high polarization and where areas of responsibility are not clearly delineated.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Economica
Economica ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
49
审稿时长
5 weeks
期刊介绍: Economica is an international journal devoted to research in all branches of economics. Theoretical and empirical articles are welcome from all parts of the international research community. Economica is a leading economics journal, appearing high in the published citation rankings. In addition to the main papers which make up each issue, there is an extensive review section, covering a wide range of recently published titles at all levels.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信