Resilient and robust control strategy against deception attacks in the platoon of vehicles

A platoon must ensure the security of conducting missions due to the susceptibility of the vehicles to cyber-attacks. The deception attack is a common type of cyber-attack that might be introduced during data exchange through communication channels. Therefore, it can divert each vehicle by injecting uncertainty into the communication link between the agents in the cyber domain. This paper employs a leader–follower consensus system as a reference model to control the platoon vehicles. Accordingly, each agent in the reference model sends its information as a reference trajectory to its corresponding vehicle within the platoon. The vehicles are equipped with a robust local controller, enabling them to follow their desired trajectory in the presence of external disturbances. Furthermore, each vehicle employs an unknown input observer to detect a deception attack while decoupling it from external disturbances. Moreover, by introducing a switching strategy based on mode-dependent average dwell time to the leader–follower consensus system, a novel resilient control strategy against the deception attack is implemented in the cyber domain. The resultant resilient leader–follower consensus system in the platoon retrieves and restores the attacked vehicle in the platoon to its associated states. The applicability of the proposed method is shown via simulation.