腐败经历与外国投资:干净的手还是肮脏的手?

IF 8.6 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Negash Haile Dedho, René Belderbos, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra
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引用次数: 0

摘要

东道国的腐败阻碍了跨国公司的对外投资。尽管如此,跨国公司可能仍然希望进行投资,以便从当地的商业机会中获益。为了应对在腐败的东道国开展业务所面临的挑战,跨国公司可以利用在其他腐败国家获得的经验。我们将对腐败的学习分为 "干净的手 "和 "肮脏的手"--即学习如何避免行贿,或学习如何行贿并避免被追查。我们通过评估母国执行反海外贿赂法律的情况如何改变先前在腐败国家的经历如何减轻东道国腐败对投资的阻碍作用,来区分这两种在以往研究中被混淆的相互竞争的机制。我们认为,在 "干净的手 "学习的情况下,母国执法会加强这种影响,而在 "肮脏的手 "学习的情况下,母国执法会削弱这种影响。通过分析来自 97 个国家的 25,067 家跨国公司在 2008 年至 2016 年期间对 101 个国家的 91,371 项新建投资所做的投资地点选择,我们发现,腐败经历会减轻东道国腐败的阻碍性影响,但母国对反贿赂法律的执行则会逆转这种影响。这与 "脏手学习 "优于 "干净手学习 "的观点一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Corruption experience and foreign investments: clean hands or dirty hands learning?

Host-country corruption discourages multinational firms’ foreign investments. Nonetheless, multinationals may still want to invest to benefit from local business opportunities. To deal with the challenges of operating in a corrupt host country, they can use experience gained in other corrupt countries. We distinguish between “clean hands” and “dirty hands” learning about corruption – that is to say, learning how to avoid bribing, or learning how to pay bribes and avoid traceability. We disentangle these two competing mechanisms, which were confounded in previous studies, by assessing how home-country enforcement of laws against bribery abroad modifies how prior experience in corrupt countries mitigates the discouraging effect of host-country corruption on investment. We propose that, under clean hands learning, home-country enforcement strengthens the mitigating influence whereas, under dirty hands learning, home-country enforcement weakens this influence. Results from analyzing the location choices made by 25,067 multinationals from 97 countries for their 91,371 greenfield investments in 101 countries from 2008 to 2016 reveal that corruption experience mitigates the discouraging influence of host country corruption but that home country enforcement of laws against bribery reverses this influence. This is consistent with the view that dirty hands learning prevails over clean hands learning.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
16.20
自引率
10.30%
发文量
84
期刊介绍: The Selection Committee for the JIBS Decade Award is pleased to announce that the 2023 award will be presented to Anthony Goerzen, Christian Geisler Asmussen, and Bo Bernhard Nielsen for their article titled "Global cities and multinational enterprise location strategy," published in JIBS in 2013 (volume 44, issue 5, pages 427-450). The prestigious JIBS Decade Award, sponsored by Palgrave Macmillan, recognizes the most influential paper published in the Journal of International Business Studies from a decade earlier. The award will be presented at the annual AIB conference. To be eligible for the JIBS Decade Award, an article must be one of the top five most cited papers published in JIBS for the respective year. The Selection Committee for this year included Kaz Asakawa, Jeremy Clegg, Catherine Welch, and Rosalie L. Tung, serving as the Committee Chair and JIBS Editor-in-Chief, all from distinguished universities around the world.
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