{"title":"采用全球最低税额的战略激励措施","authors":"Wei Cui","doi":"10.1093/jla/laae008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The USA, alongside many other nations, presently faces a vital policy choice: should it adopt the global minimum tax proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, purportedly to ensure basic levels of corporate taxation of large multinationals? I set out a framework for analyzing and predicting global minimum tax adoption by self-interested, national-income-maximizing governments. Contrary to both popular and prior scholarly claims, the global minimum tax is incentive incompatible: countries from which multinationals originate will likely suffer deep losses; the tax’s purported enforcement tool, even read in an aggressive, controversial fashion, is ineffective. The global minimum tax may unravel despite initial adoption. (JEL codes: F23, F55, H25, H73, H87, K34).","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategic Incentives for Adopting the Global Minimum Tax\",\"authors\":\"Wei Cui\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/jla/laae008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The USA, alongside many other nations, presently faces a vital policy choice: should it adopt the global minimum tax proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, purportedly to ensure basic levels of corporate taxation of large multinationals? I set out a framework for analyzing and predicting global minimum tax adoption by self-interested, national-income-maximizing governments. Contrary to both popular and prior scholarly claims, the global minimum tax is incentive incompatible: countries from which multinationals originate will likely suffer deep losses; the tax’s purported enforcement tool, even read in an aggressive, controversial fashion, is ineffective. The global minimum tax may unravel despite initial adoption. (JEL codes: F23, F55, H25, H73, H87, K34).\",\"PeriodicalId\":45189,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Legal Analysis\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-12-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Legal Analysis\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laae008\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Legal Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laae008","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategic Incentives for Adopting the Global Minimum Tax
The USA, alongside many other nations, presently faces a vital policy choice: should it adopt the global minimum tax proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, purportedly to ensure basic levels of corporate taxation of large multinationals? I set out a framework for analyzing and predicting global minimum tax adoption by self-interested, national-income-maximizing governments. Contrary to both popular and prior scholarly claims, the global minimum tax is incentive incompatible: countries from which multinationals originate will likely suffer deep losses; the tax’s purported enforcement tool, even read in an aggressive, controversial fashion, is ineffective. The global minimum tax may unravel despite initial adoption. (JEL codes: F23, F55, H25, H73, H87, K34).