确保商业核酸合成。

Rand health quarterly Pub Date : 2024-12-10 eCollection Date: 2024-12-01
Forrest W Crawford, Kyle Webster, Gerald L Epstein, Derek Roberts, Joseph Fair, Sella Nevo
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引用次数: 0

摘要

按需基因合成是一个不断发展的行业,它使生物研究中使用的定制合成脱氧核糖核酸(DNA)和核糖核酸(RNA)产品变得更加大众化。然而,定制合成核酸的可获得性的增加和成本的降低带来了误用的风险,这可能使不法分子获得危险生物体的序列或新型工程病原体来构建生物武器。确保核酸合成是美国政府和合成生物学产业的一项优先政策。但是,目前没有法律要求基因合成供应商筛选他们的客户或他们的订单,以确保所要求的合成DNA和RNA结构不被用于有害目的。许多供应商自愿筛选订单,但目前还没有普遍接受的筛选客户或订单的标准。在本研究中,作者回顾了政府筛选指南、行业联盟要求、立法建议和科学文献,以评估商业基因合成筛选的现状;总结加强筛选的建议;并为实施全面筛查政策提供建议,以确保商业核酸合成。这些建议扩展并加强了政府沟通、行业联盟规则和最佳实践,以及研究人员和供应商组织提出的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Securing Commercial Nucleic Acid Synthesis.

On-demand gene synthesis is a growing industry that has democratized access to customized synthetic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and ribonucleic acid (RNA) products used in biological research. However, the increasing availability and decreasing cost of custom synthetic nucleic acids presents a risk of misuse that could allow nefarious actors to obtain sequences of dangerous organisms or novel-engineered pathogens to construct a biological weapon. Securing nucleic acid synthesis is a policy priority for the U.S. government and the synthetic biology industry. But there is currently no legal requirement that gene synthesis providers screen their customers or their orders to ensure that the requested synthetic DNA and RNA constructs are not used for harmful purposes. Many providers screen orders voluntarily, but there is currently no universally accepted standard for screening customers or orders. In this study, the authors review government screening guidelines, industry consortium requirements, legislative proposals, and the scientific literature to assess the current state of commercial gene synthesis screening; summarize proposals for strengthening screening; and contribute recommendations for implementing comprehensive screening policies to secure commercial nucleic acid synthesis. These recommendations expand on and strengthen government communications, industry consortium rules and best practices, and proposals developed by researchers and provider organizations.

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