更有效的董事监督是否会使管理层的指导更可信?

Tyler K. Jensen, Marlene A. Plumlee, Jared I. Wilson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

治理对披露可信度影响的先前证据尚无定论。特别是,先前的研究无法证明董事会特征与分析师对管理指导的反应之间存在显著关联。通过在监管后公平披露(Reg-FD)的大型样本中分离董事监督的外生变化,我们发现,监督的增加与分析师对管理指导中新闻的更强反应有关。我们也记录了横断面差异,当外部验证的角色是最重要的(例如,好消息预测,低分析师跟随)时,监控是特别有影响的。我们确定了与以下因素相关的外部监督冲击:(1)董事死亡,(2)萨班斯-奥克斯利法案(SOX)要求的强制性独立性,以及(3)由于消除其他公司董事会职位的并购活动而导致的董事注意力变化。总体而言,我们的研究结果为董事监督影响管理指导的感知可信度提供了强有力的支持,特别是在需要外部验证的情况下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does more effective director monitoring make management guidance more credible?
Prior evidence of the impact of governance on disclosure credibility is inconclusive. In particular, prior studies are unable to document a significant association between board of director characteristics and analyst reactions to management guidance. By isolating exogenous variation in director monitoring in a large, post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg-FD) sample, we find that increased monitoring is associated with stronger analyst reactions to news in management guidance. We also document cross-sectional differences, consistent with monitoring being particularly impactful when the role of external verification is most important (e.g., good news forecasts, low analyst following). We identify exogenous shocks to monitoring associated with (1) director deaths, (2) mandated independence required by Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), and (3) changes in director attention due to M&A activities that eliminate board positions at other firms. Overall, our findings provide strong support for director monitoring influencing the perceived credibility of management guidance, especially in settings where external validation is needed.
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