Linguistic Othering and epistemic injustice in philosophy

In this symposium piece, I follow Lu-Adler’s lead in scrutinizing the connections between linguistic Othering and prevailing yet exclusionary academic practices of knowledge production, focusing on linguistic epistemic injustice in academia. Specifically, I suggest that in a global academic context marked by sharp inequalities of opportunity due inter alia to linguistic Othering, language often operates as a threefold criterion for knowledge validation and hence for the allocation of credibility and intelligibility. I submit that linguistic selection (i.e., which language is used for knowledge production and transmission), linguistic form (i.e., the way a given language is spoken or written), and linguistic content (i.e., the words or concepts a given language offers and uses to describe and make sense of the world) are all ways in which language can be used to validate or invalidate processes of knowledge production and thereby result in unjust allocations of credibility and intelligibility. I argue that language can thus sometimes function as what I have called elsewhere a “meta-epistemic filter,” which creates an unjust credibility and intelligibility economy by predetermining in a structurally biased way what kinds of epistemic contributions are (made) available or count as admissible or inadmissible in the first place. I close by exploring how we might foster greater linguistic epistemic justice in academia by cultivating meta-linguistic awareness and how this might be facilitated by attending to the role that experiential (as opposed to merely propositional) knowledge might play.