双边市场的稳定性与最优双拍卖设计

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-11-23 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003

Aditya Vikram

{"title":"双边市场的稳定性与最优双拍卖设计","authors":"Aditya Vikram","doi":"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We investigate the stability of internet platform trading mechanisms using the notion of ex-ante incentive compatible core defined by Forges et al. (2002) in the context of an exchange economy. A mechanism can be blocked by a single buyer and seller pair if they can find an interim incentive-compatible trading mechanism that gives them higher ex-ante expected utilities. Standard double auction mechanisms like the trade reduction mechanism and McAfee double auction mechanism may not be single-buyer–single-seller (SBSS) ex-ante stable. We characterize interim incentive-compatible, interim individually-rational, symmetric and revenue-maximizing mechanisms that are SBSS ex-ante stable using methods in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).</div></div>","PeriodicalId":51118,"journal":{"name":"Mathematical Social Sciences","volume":"133 ","pages":"Pages 1-12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market\",\"authors\":\"Aditya Vikram\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.11.003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>We investigate the stability of internet platform trading mechanisms using the notion of ex-ante incentive compatible core defined by Forges et al. (2002) in the context of an exchange economy. A mechanism can be blocked by a single buyer and seller pair if they can find an interim incentive-compatible trading mechanism that gives them higher ex-ante expected utilities. Standard double auction mechanisms like the trade reduction mechanism and McAfee double auction mechanism may not be single-buyer–single-seller (SBSS) ex-ante stable. We characterize interim incentive-compatible, interim individually-rational, symmetric and revenue-maximizing mechanisms that are SBSS ex-ante stable using methods in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51118,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Mathematical Social Sciences\",\"volume\":\"133 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 1-12\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Mathematical Social Sciences\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000945\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Mathematical Social Sciences","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489624000945","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们利用Forges等人（2002）在交换经济背景下定义的事前激励兼容核心概念来研究互联网平台交易机制的稳定性。如果一个买方和卖方能找到一个临时激励兼容的交易机制，给他们更高的事前预期效用，一个机制就可以被阻止。标准的双重拍卖机制，如贸易削减机制和McAfee双重拍卖机制，可能不是单买方-单卖方（SBSS）事前稳定的。我们使用Myerson和Satterthwaite（1983）的方法描述了临时激励兼容、临时个人理性、对称和收入最大化机制，这些机制是SBSS事前稳定的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market

We investigate the stability of internet platform trading mechanisms using the notion of ex-ante incentive compatible core defined by Forges et al. (2002) in the context of an exchange economy. A mechanism can be blocked by a single buyer and seller pair if they can find an interim incentive-compatible trading mechanism that gives them higher ex-ante expected utilities. Standard double auction mechanisms like the trade reduction mechanism and McAfee double auction mechanism may not be single-buyer–single-seller (SBSS) ex-ante stable. We characterize interim incentive-compatible, interim individually-rational, symmetric and revenue-maximizing mechanisms that are SBSS ex-ante stable using methods in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

59 days

期刊介绍： The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.