认知技能如何影响战略行为：认知能力、流动智能和判断力

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-10-31 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.007

David Gill , Zachary Knepper , Victoria Prowse , Junya Zhou

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们探讨了认知能力和判断力对选美比赛博弈（纳什均衡行动为零）中战略行为的影响。利用有界理性的 level-k 模型，认知能力和判断力都能预测更高层次的战略思维。然而，判断力更强的个体选择零的频率更低，我们发现了一种新的动态机制来揭示这种模式。综合来看，我们的研究结果表明，流体智力（即分析性智力）是策略水平-k 思维的主要驱动力，而与流体智力不同的判断力因素则会降低高判断力个体的零选择倾向。

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How cognitive skills affect strategic behavior: Cognitive ability, fluid intelligence and judgment

We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelligence is a primary driver of strategic level-k thinking, while facets of judgment that are distinct from fluid intelligence drive the lower inclination of high judgment individuals to choose zero.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology