政治关联企业的负面信息囤积:中央环保督查的影响

IF 4.8 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Shuai Yue, Hamish D. Anderson, Jing Liao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了在中央政府环保检查的背景下,管理者的政治关系如何影响企业的信息环境。我们发现,与没有政治关系的企业相比,有政治关系的企业在中央政府检查后面临的撞车风险更高。此外,我们还发现,当企业拥有政治关系(如被任命为政治咨询机构成员)而非政治关系(即拥有政府官员的工作经验)时,更容易出现崩盘风险。进一步的分析表明,有政治关系的企业在中央政府检查后更容易因声誉问题而面临崩盘风险。总体而言,我们的研究突出表明,当监管审查加强时,与政治有关联的企业在管理负面信息方面可能面临更多挑战,这加剧了企业的风险状况。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Negative information hoarding in politically connected firms: The influence from the central environmental protection inspections
This study examines how managerial political connections affect corporate information environment in the context of central government environmental inspections. We find that politically connected firms are associated with higher crash risk than firms without such connections after central government inspections. In addition, we find that firms are more prone to crash risk when they are with achieved political connections (e.g. appointed as members of political advisory bodies), but not ascribed political connections (i.e. have work experience as government officials). Further analyses indicate that politically connected firms are more prone to crash risk after central government inspections due to increased reputational concerns. Overall, our study highlights that politically connected firms may face more challenges in managing negative information when there is intensified regulatory scrutiny, which exacerbates the risk profile of firms.
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来源期刊
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
6.80
自引率
6.50%
发文量
157
期刊介绍: The Pacific-Basin Finance Journal is aimed at providing a specialized forum for the publication of academic research on capital markets of the Asia-Pacific countries. Primary emphasis will be placed on the highest quality empirical and theoretical research in the following areas: • Market Micro-structure; • Investment and Portfolio Management; • Theories of Market Equilibrium; • Valuation of Financial and Real Assets; • Behavior of Asset Prices in Financial Sectors; • Normative Theory of Financial Management; • Capital Markets of Development; • Market Mechanisms.
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