Evidential Incognizance

In this article, I explore an epistemic vice I call “evidential incognizance.” It is a vice of failing generally to recognize evidence, or recognize the full force of evidence, in a domain of knowledge. It frequently manifests as a kind of unbridled skepticism or hopelessness about knowing in the domain, including (but not limited to) skepticism about expert testimony. It is epistemically vicious primarily because it leads people to overlook valuable epistemic opportunities, and thus tends to obstruct knowledge and justified belief. I believe it is of interest particularly because it tends to arise as a reaction to a certain kind of information environment and is often induced intentionally by populist candidates and authoritarian regimes. I discuss the nature of evidential incognizance, its relation to and differences from other epistemic shortcomings, its political significance, why it may have been previously overlooked in the literature, and the potential for overcoming it.