Personhood, Dementia, and Bioethics.

Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) has called for bioethics to end talk about personhood, asserting that such talk has the tendency to confuse and offend. It will be argued that this has only limited application for (largely) private settings. However, in other settings, theorizing about personhood leaves a gap in which there is the risk that the offending concept will get uptake elsewhere, and so the problem Blumenthal-Barby nominates may not be completely avoided. In response to this risk, an argument is presented in support of the idea that the role of philosophers and bioethicists, far from ending talk of personhood, ought to be to clarify the concept, and to do so in nuanced ways, given its application for specific kinds of impairments. The case of dementia is used to illustrate this in the context of person-centered care. Ironically, given the stigma attached to dementia, far from the need to end talk of personhood, bioethicists are needed to rescue the concept and clarify its role.