{"title":"研究认知负荷对意向性偏差的影响。","authors":"A E Eisenkoeck, J W de Fockert, J W Moore","doi":"10.1007/s00426-024-02047-3","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to Rosset's dual-process model of intention attribution, our judgements of intentionality can be guided either by an automatic process leading to intentional explanations of behaviour or by a higher-level and cognitively more demanding process enabling unintentional explanations of behaviour. Based on this model, under conditions of compromised cognitive capacity, individuals should judge more behaviour to be intentional rather than unintentional. This prediction was tested in one lab-based experiment and one online experiment. Specifically, we investigated whether increased working memory load would lead to higher intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action when controlling for individual differences in working memory. Results of both experiments indicated no effect of working memory load on intentionality endorsement. The implications of these results for the dual-process model of intention attribution are discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":48184,"journal":{"name":"Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung","volume":"89 1","pages":"4"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11557632/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Investigating the effect of cognitive load on the intentionality bias.\",\"authors\":\"A E Eisenkoeck, J W de Fockert, J W Moore\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s00426-024-02047-3\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>According to Rosset's dual-process model of intention attribution, our judgements of intentionality can be guided either by an automatic process leading to intentional explanations of behaviour or by a higher-level and cognitively more demanding process enabling unintentional explanations of behaviour. Based on this model, under conditions of compromised cognitive capacity, individuals should judge more behaviour to be intentional rather than unintentional. This prediction was tested in one lab-based experiment and one online experiment. Specifically, we investigated whether increased working memory load would lead to higher intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action when controlling for individual differences in working memory. Results of both experiments indicated no effect of working memory load on intentionality endorsement. The implications of these results for the dual-process model of intention attribution are discussed.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48184,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung\",\"volume\":\"89 1\",\"pages\":\"4\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC11557632/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-024-02047-3\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"心理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Psychological Research-Psychologische Forschung","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-024-02047-3","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
Investigating the effect of cognitive load on the intentionality bias.
According to Rosset's dual-process model of intention attribution, our judgements of intentionality can be guided either by an automatic process leading to intentional explanations of behaviour or by a higher-level and cognitively more demanding process enabling unintentional explanations of behaviour. Based on this model, under conditions of compromised cognitive capacity, individuals should judge more behaviour to be intentional rather than unintentional. This prediction was tested in one lab-based experiment and one online experiment. Specifically, we investigated whether increased working memory load would lead to higher intentionality endorsement of ambiguous action when controlling for individual differences in working memory. Results of both experiments indicated no effect of working memory load on intentionality endorsement. The implications of these results for the dual-process model of intention attribution are discussed.
期刊介绍:
Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung publishes articles that contribute to a basic understanding of human perception, attention, memory, and action. The Journal is devoted to the dissemination of knowledge based on firm experimental ground, but not to particular approaches or schools of thought. Theoretical and historical papers are welcome to the extent that they serve this general purpose; papers of an applied nature are acceptable if they contribute to basic understanding or serve to bridge the often felt gap between basic and applied research in the field covered by the Journal.