对概率的进一步认知:准确的逐步更新取决于任务和反应模式的先验信息。

IF 3.2 3区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL
Mattias Forsgren, Peter Juslin, Ronald van den Berg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

为了适应不确定的世界,人类必须学习事件概率。这些概率可能是静态的,比如掷骰子掷出 6 的概率,也可能是随时间变化的,比如一年中降雨的概率。关于人们如何估计和跟踪不断变化的概率的研究,最近重新提出了一个古老的认识论问题。少量的、大多是最新的文献发现,人们准确地跟踪概率,只是偶尔改变他们的估计,从而形成阶梯状的反应模式。这被认为是人们对未知的、遥远的世界状态抱有信念的证据,这些信念通过观察得到检验,从而产生假设之间的离散变化。这一观点与人们通过不断更新观察到的事件之间的关联来学习的说法形成了鲜明对比。本文旨在研究准确的阶梯模式的普遍性和稳健性。在两个实验中,我们发现反应模式取决于反应模式和关于生成过程的先验信息。参与者在准确性和阶梯性上存在连续性,而我们只有在改变估计值需要付出努力和提供先验信息的情况下--也就是之前实验的特定条件下--才会重现之前的结果。我们的结论是,仅仅通过假设或联想来解释这一点是站不住脚的。完整的概率估计理论需要三个组成部分的相互作用:(i) 对观察数据的在线跟踪,(ii) 对未观察到的 "生成过程 "的信念,以及 (iii) 反应更新过程。参与者的公开估计取决于具体任务条件如何共同决定这三个部分。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Further perceptions of probability: Accurate, stepwise updating is contingent on prior information about the task and the response mode.

To adapt to an uncertain world, humans must learn event probabilities. These probabilities may be stationary, such as that of rolling a 6 on a die, or changing over time, like the probability of rainfall over the year. Research on how people estimate and track changing probabilities has recently reopened an old epistemological issue. A small, mostly recent literature finds that people accurately track the probability and change their estimates only occasionally, resulting in staircase-shaped response patterns. This has been taken as evidence that people entertain beliefs about unknown, distal states of the world, which are tested against observations to produce discrete shifts between hypotheses. That idea stands in contrast to the claim that people learn by continuously updating associations between observed events. The purpose of this article is to investigate the generality and robustness of the accurate, staircase-shaped pattern. In two experiments, we find that the response pattern is contingent on the response mode and prior information about the generative process. Participants exist on continua of accuracy and staircase-ness and we only reproduce previous results when changing estimates is effortful and prior information is provided-the specific conditions of previous experiments. We conclude that explaining this solely through either hypotheses or associations is untenable. A complete theory of probability estimation requires the interaction of three components: (i) online tracking of observed data, (ii) beliefs about the unobserved "generative process," and (iii) a response updating process. Participants' overt estimates depend on how the specific task conditions jointly determine all three.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.70
自引率
2.90%
发文量
165
期刊介绍: The journal provides coverage spanning a broad spectrum of topics in all areas of experimental psychology. The journal is primarily dedicated to the publication of theory and review articles and brief reports of outstanding experimental work. Areas of coverage include cognitive psychology broadly construed, including but not limited to action, perception, & attention, language, learning & memory, reasoning & decision making, and social cognition. We welcome submissions that approach these issues from a variety of perspectives such as behavioral measurements, comparative psychology, development, evolutionary psychology, genetics, neuroscience, and quantitative/computational modeling. We particularly encourage integrative research that crosses traditional content and methodological boundaries.
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