Ren-Jie Zhang , Hsing-Wei Tai , Zheng-Xu Cao , Kuo-Tai Cheng , Chia-Chen Wei
{"title":"基于低碳技术的创新生态系统:价值共创机制与差异博弈分析","authors":"Ren-Jie Zhang , Hsing-Wei Tai , Zheng-Xu Cao , Kuo-Tai Cheng , Chia-Chen Wei","doi":"10.1016/j.techfore.2024.123852","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the context of global carbon emission reduction trends, the mechanism of value co-creation plays an instrumental role in the construction of innovative ecosystems based on low-carbon technologies. This study introduces a triple helix analytical framework for value co-creation in innovative ecosystems and constructs a three-party differential game model that incorporates innovators, service providers, and regulators. The model examines the conditions of strategic stability and sensitivity among different game players and makes the following conclusions: (1) Innovators' strategies are linearly influenced by the combined strategies of service providers and regulators, while the effect of innovators and regulators on service providers is non-linear. (2) During the initial stages of the innovation ecosystem, the regulator plays the roles of architect and controller. The <em>NES</em> strategy, aimed at reducing intervention, is triggered when the <em>LCI</em> and <em>GRS</em> strategies exceed certain thresholds. (3) Fiscal subsidies accelerate the convergence of the evolution curves of innovators' and service providers' strategies but also increase the cost burden for regulators, leading them toward passive management measures. (4) Upper-level accountability promotes the evolution of the three-party differential game system from “chaos” to “order,” with the intermediary effect becoming the main route influencing innovation strategy choices. Lastly, the findings suggest that policy measures, such as empowering low-carbon technology innovation with digital technologies, enhancing green service capabilities, and improving green technology assessment systems, may provide empirical evidence for decision-making by management departments.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":12,"journal":{"name":"ACS Chemical Health & Safety","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Innovation ecosystem based on low-carbon technology: Value co-creation mechanism and differential game analysis\",\"authors\":\"Ren-Jie Zhang , Hsing-Wei Tai , Zheng-Xu Cao , Kuo-Tai Cheng , Chia-Chen Wei\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.techfore.2024.123852\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>In the context of global carbon emission reduction trends, the mechanism of value co-creation plays an instrumental role in the construction of innovative ecosystems based on low-carbon technologies. This study introduces a triple helix analytical framework for value co-creation in innovative ecosystems and constructs a three-party differential game model that incorporates innovators, service providers, and regulators. The model examines the conditions of strategic stability and sensitivity among different game players and makes the following conclusions: (1) Innovators' strategies are linearly influenced by the combined strategies of service providers and regulators, while the effect of innovators and regulators on service providers is non-linear. (2) During the initial stages of the innovation ecosystem, the regulator plays the roles of architect and controller. The <em>NES</em> strategy, aimed at reducing intervention, is triggered when the <em>LCI</em> and <em>GRS</em> strategies exceed certain thresholds. (3) Fiscal subsidies accelerate the convergence of the evolution curves of innovators' and service providers' strategies but also increase the cost burden for regulators, leading them toward passive management measures. (4) Upper-level accountability promotes the evolution of the three-party differential game system from “chaos” to “order,” with the intermediary effect becoming the main route influencing innovation strategy choices. Lastly, the findings suggest that policy measures, such as empowering low-carbon technology innovation with digital technologies, enhancing green service capabilities, and improving green technology assessment systems, may provide empirical evidence for decision-making by management departments.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":12,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACS Chemical Health & Safety\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-11-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACS Chemical Health & Safety\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162524006504\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACS Chemical Health & Safety","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162524006504","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PUBLIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH","Score":null,"Total":0}
Innovation ecosystem based on low-carbon technology: Value co-creation mechanism and differential game analysis
In the context of global carbon emission reduction trends, the mechanism of value co-creation plays an instrumental role in the construction of innovative ecosystems based on low-carbon technologies. This study introduces a triple helix analytical framework for value co-creation in innovative ecosystems and constructs a three-party differential game model that incorporates innovators, service providers, and regulators. The model examines the conditions of strategic stability and sensitivity among different game players and makes the following conclusions: (1) Innovators' strategies are linearly influenced by the combined strategies of service providers and regulators, while the effect of innovators and regulators on service providers is non-linear. (2) During the initial stages of the innovation ecosystem, the regulator plays the roles of architect and controller. The NES strategy, aimed at reducing intervention, is triggered when the LCI and GRS strategies exceed certain thresholds. (3) Fiscal subsidies accelerate the convergence of the evolution curves of innovators' and service providers' strategies but also increase the cost burden for regulators, leading them toward passive management measures. (4) Upper-level accountability promotes the evolution of the three-party differential game system from “chaos” to “order,” with the intermediary effect becoming the main route influencing innovation strategy choices. Lastly, the findings suggest that policy measures, such as empowering low-carbon technology innovation with digital technologies, enhancing green service capabilities, and improving green technology assessment systems, may provide empirical evidence for decision-making by management departments.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Chemical Health and Safety focuses on news, information, and ideas relating to issues and advances in chemical health and safety. The Journal of Chemical Health and Safety covers up-to-the minute, in-depth views of safety issues ranging from OSHA and EPA regulations to the safe handling of hazardous waste, from the latest innovations in effective chemical hygiene practices to the courts'' most recent rulings on safety-related lawsuits. The Journal of Chemical Health and Safety presents real-world information that health, safety and environmental professionals and others responsible for the safety of their workplaces can put to use right away, identifying potential and developing safety concerns before they do real harm.