在职者何时以及如何应对潜在的破坏性事件?

IF 1.9 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Benoît Chevalier-Roignant
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引用次数: 0

摘要

对于初创企业带来的竞争威胁,现有企业可以通过外部或内部增长来应对。由于一种被称为 "在位惯性 "的现象,在位企业可能会在适当的时候失败。我建立了一个动态投资模型,强调了这种惰性的新理由。在位者可能会等待,即使推迟一个反应的选择是 "赚大钱"。这是因为在位者必须在几种可能的对策中做出选择,而且在战略上对哪种对策最好犹豫不决。如果在位者推迟了风险资本家获利丰厚的退出时机,那么这种惰性对初创企业的估值来说是个坏消息,但如果能维持更激烈的竞争,那么对消费者来说则是个好消息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
When and how should an incumbent respond to a potentially disruptive event?
Incumbents can respond to the competitive threat posed by a startup either by external or organic growth. Incumbents may fail do so in due course due to a phenomenon known as “incumbent inertia.” I develop a dynamic model of investment that stresses a new rationale for such inertia. The incumbent may wait even though the option to delay one response is “deep in the money.” This is because the incumbent has to make a choice among several possible responses and is strategically ambivalent about which is best. Such inertia would be bad news for startup valuations if the incumbent delays a lucrative exit for venture capitalists, but good news for consumers if it sustains fiercer competition.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.10
自引率
10.50%
发文量
199
期刊介绍: The journal provides an outlet for publication of research concerning all theoretical and empirical aspects of economic dynamics and control as well as the development and use of computational methods in economics and finance. Contributions regarding computational methods may include, but are not restricted to, artificial intelligence, databases, decision support systems, genetic algorithms, modelling languages, neural networks, numerical algorithms for optimization, control and equilibria, parallel computing and qualitative reasoning.
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