工作动力与团队

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2024-10-11 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112020

Simone Haeckl , Rupert Sausgruber , Jean-Robert Tyran

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了一种新颖的技术，利用实际努力实验中偏离金钱最大化基准的情况来衡量任务的工作动机。尽管我们发现，平均产出会随着团队激励和观察结果的增加而增加，但我们也发现，具有高内在动机的工人并不会对团队激励做出反应。原因在于，积极性高的工人已经在努力工作，而团队激励的力度不足以克服额外努力的高成本。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Work motivation and teams

This paper presents a novel technique to measure motivation for working on a task using deviations from the money-maximising benchmark in a real-effort experiment. Although we find that average output increases in response to team incentives and observation, we also find that workers with high intrinsic motivation do not respond to team incentives. The reason is that highly motivated workers already work hard, and team incentives are not strong enough to overcome the high cost of additional effort.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.