对同行的制裁对观察企业的关联方交易有威慑作用吗？来自中国上市公司的证据

IF 4.2 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Economic Modelling Pub Date : 2024-09-28 DOI:10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106898

Jian Zhou , Jianglong Yu , Xiaodong Lei

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引用次数: 0

摘要

如何有效约束关联方交易已引起学术界和实务界的广泛关注。虽然大量文献研究了影响关联方交易的因素，但却忽视了对同业的制裁对其他公司关联方交易的影响。利用 2002 年至 2021 年中国上市公司的面板数据，我们发现对同行的制裁会对观察企业产生威慑效应。提高制裁的确定性或严厉程度会显著减少观察企业的关联方交易。机制检验表明，媒体报道、行业竞争和社会信任加强了这种威慑效应。进一步分析表明，制裁的威慑效应主要由间接声誉效应驱动。此外，我们还发现国有企业和非国有企业都存在威慑效应。我们的研究揭示了中国资本市场的执法效力，并为提高新兴经济体的监管效率提供了重要启示。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Do sanctions imposed on peers have a deterrence effect on related-party transactions of observing firms? Evidence from Chinese listed firms

How to effectively discipline related-party transactions has garnered widespread attention from both academia and practice. While extensive literature has examined the factors influencing related-party transactions, it has overlooked the impact of sanctions imposed on peers on the related-party transactions of other firms. Using panel data covering Chinese listed firms from 2002 to 2021, we find that sanctions imposed on peers have a deterrence effect on observing firms. Increasing the certainty or severity of sanctions significantly reduces related-party transactions in observing firms. Mechanism tests demonstrate that media coverage, industry competition, and social trust strengthen this deterrence effect. Further analysis suggests the deterrence effect of sanctions is primarily driven by indirect reputation effects. Additionally, we find that deterrence effect exists in both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs. Our study sheds light on the efficacy of enforcement in the Chinese capital market and offers important implications for enhancing regulatory efficiency in emerging economies.

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来源期刊

Economic Modelling ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

8.00

自引率

10.60%

发文量

295

期刊介绍： Economic Modelling fills a major gap in the economics literature, providing a single source of both theoretical and applied papers on economic modelling. The journal prime objective is to provide an international review of the state-of-the-art in economic modelling. Economic Modelling publishes the complete versions of many large-scale models of industrially advanced economies which have been developed for policy analysis. Examples are the Bank of England Model and the US Federal Reserve Board Model which had hitherto been unpublished. As individual models are revised and updated, the journal publishes subsequent papers dealing with these revisions, so keeping its readers as up to date as possible.