向经理和预算有限的代理商销售产品

IF 1 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2024-10-04 DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103062

Debasis Mishra, Kolagani Paramahamsa

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了一个向经理和代理人出售单一物品的模型。经理和代理对物品对公司的价值有不同的评估。代理人有预算限制，而经理没有。代理人参与到机制中，但她可以（策略性地）接近经理进行决策。我们在二维类型空间（代理人和管理者的价值）中推导出收益最大化机制。我们证明，在低于预算临界值的情况下，涉及两个挂牌价格和三个结果（其中一个涉及随机化）的机制是卖方的最优机制。否则，单一挂牌价格机制就是最优的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Selling to a manager and a budget-constrained agent

We analyze a model of selling a single object to a manager-agent pair who want to acquire the object for a firm. The manager and the agent have different assessments of the object’s value to the firm. The agent is budget-constrained while the manager is not. The agent participates in the mechanism, but she can (strategically) approach the manager for decision-making. We derive the revenue-maximizing mechanism in a two-dimensional type space (values of the agent and the manager). We show that below a threshold budget, a mechanism involving two posted prices and three outcomes (one of which involves randomization) is the optimal mechanism for the seller. Otherwise, a single posted price mechanism is optimal.

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来源期刊

Journal of Mathematical Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.70

自引率

7.70%

发文量

审稿时长

12.5 weeks

期刊介绍： The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.