{"title":"公平、中立和高效的表决规则","authors":"Steven Kivinen","doi":"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In the context of voting, Moulin (1980) establishes that anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are often incompatible unless one accepts indecision (i.e. ties). We show that versions of this incompatibility continue to hold for a natural weakening of anonymity proposed by Bartholdi et al. (2021) called <em>equity</em>. As equity is a relatively weak fairness requirement, the tension between fairness and efficiency in voting is deeper than previously established.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":50145,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","volume":"115 ","pages":"Article 103061"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules\",\"authors\":\"Steven Kivinen\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103061\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>In the context of voting, Moulin (1980) establishes that anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are often incompatible unless one accepts indecision (i.e. ties). We show that versions of this incompatibility continue to hold for a natural weakening of anonymity proposed by Bartholdi et al. (2021) called <em>equity</em>. As equity is a relatively weak fairness requirement, the tension between fairness and efficiency in voting is deeper than previously established.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":50145,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Mathematical Economics\",\"volume\":\"115 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103061\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Mathematical Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001216\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Mathematical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304406824001216","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
In the context of voting, Moulin (1980) establishes that anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency are often incompatible unless one accepts indecision (i.e. ties). We show that versions of this incompatibility continue to hold for a natural weakening of anonymity proposed by Bartholdi et al. (2021) called equity. As equity is a relatively weak fairness requirement, the tension between fairness and efficiency in voting is deeper than previously established.
期刊介绍:
The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.