官僚的优先事项是什么?采购官员联合实验的证据

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Janne Tukiainen , Sebastian Blesse , Albrecht Bohne , Leonardo M. Giuffrida , Jan Jääskeläinen , Ari Luukinen , Antti Sieppi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

虽然有效的官僚机构对国家能力至关重要,但其决策仍是一个黑箱。我们从芬兰和德国的 900 多名现实世界中的公共采购官员那里了解他们的偏好。这是一项重要的工作,因为他们拥有很大的自由裁量权,而外在激励却微乎其微。通过联合实验,我们确定了采购结果多种特征的相对重要性。与追求低价相比,官员们更优先考虑避免意外的高价。避免之前表现不佳的中标者是最重要的特征。官员们避免极低的竞争,而诉讼风险和地区偏袒则不那么重要。官员的偏好和办公室利益似乎是一致的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials
While effective bureaucracy is crucial for state capacity, its decision-making remains a black box. We elicit preferences of 900+ real-world public procurement officials in Finland and Germany. This is an important pursuit as they report having sizeable discretion and minimal extrinsic incentives. Through conjoint experiments, we identify the relative importance of multiple features of procurement outcomes. Officials prioritize avoiding unexpectedly high prices over seeking low prices. Avoiding winners with prior bad performance is the most important feature. Officials avoid very low competition, while litigation risks and regional favoritism matter less. Preferences and office interests appear well-aligned among bureaucrats.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.80
自引率
9.10%
发文量
392
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.
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