竞争出版物奖励

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2024-10-05 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112017

Mike Felgenhauer

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了研究人员之间为获得发表奖励而展开的更激烈竞争如何影响发表过程的质量。可发表的结果可以通过代价高昂的信息性连续私人实验或代价高昂的非信息性操作产生。通过降低预期回报，竞争可能会抑制操作，而有利于实验，但反之亦然。竞争还能减少过度实验。这两种效应都会提高出版过程的质量。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Competition for publication-based rewards

This paper studies how more competition among researchers for publication-based rewards affects the quality of the publication process. Publishable results can be generated via costly informative sequential private experimentation or costly uninformative manipulation. By reducing expected rewards, competition may discourage manipulation in favor of experimentation, but not vice versa. It also reduces excessive experimentation. Both effects improve the quality of the publication process.

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.