在酿酒酵母种群中,报酬矩阵的进化依赖于资源的经验证据。

IF 2.1 3区 生物学 Q3 ECOLOGY
Pavithra Venkataraman, Anjali Mahilkar, Namratha Raj, Supreet Saini
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在进化博弈论中,与获取资源相关的成本和收益的相对比较(称为报酬)被用作生物体适应性的指标。不同策略的报酬以报酬矩阵的形式定量表示,用于理解物种间和物种内复杂的相互作用,如合作、互惠和利他主义。然而,报酬矩阵通常被视为随时间变化而不变--这主要是由于缺乏量化报酬矩阵演变的经验数据。在本文中,我们通过实证研究发现,在不断进化的酿酒酵母种群中,报酬矩阵会发生三种依赖资源的变化。我们发现,根据碳源和参与基因型的不同,N 人游戏可能会崩溃、诞生或维持。我们的研究结果凸显了在对种群相互作用和动态进行短期预测时考虑报酬矩阵动态性质的必要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Empirical evidence of resource dependent evolution of payoff matrices in Saccharomyces cerevisiae populations.

In evolutionary game theory, a relative comparison of the cost and benefit associated with obtaining a resource, called payoff, is used as an indicator of fitness of an organism. Payoffs of different strategies, quantitatively represented as payoff matrices, are used to understand complex inter-species and intra-species interactions like cooperation, mutualism, and altruism. Payoff matrices, however, are usually treated as invariant with time - largely due to the absence of any empirical data quantifying their evolution. In this paper, we present empirical evidence of three types of resource-dependent changes in the payoff matrices of evolving Saccharomyces cerevisiae populations. We show that depending on the carbon source and participating genotypes, N-player games could collapse, be born, or be maintained. Our results highlight the need to consider the dynamic nature of payoff matrices while making even short-term predictions about population interactions and dynamics.

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来源期刊
Journal of Evolutionary Biology
Journal of Evolutionary Biology 生物-进化生物学
CiteScore
4.20
自引率
4.80%
发文量
152
审稿时长
3-6 weeks
期刊介绍: It covers both micro- and macro-evolution of all types of organisms. The aim of the Journal is to integrate perspectives across molecular and microbial evolution, behaviour, genetics, ecology, life histories, development, palaeontology, systematics and morphology.
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