巴雷特合作悖论：30 年后的全面分析证明

IF 5.5 3区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Pub Date : 2024-08-31 DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2024.103045

Michael Finus , Francesco Furini , Anna Viktoria Rohrer

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引用次数: 0

摘要

巴雷特（Barrett，1994 年）在其开创性论文中指出，国际环境协定（IEAs）通常并不成功，他将其称为 "合作悖论"。如果全面合作的潜在收益很大，那么自我强化的国际环境协定的参与度就很低，因此无法取得很大成就；或者，如果潜在收益很小，那么即使国际环境协定的参与度很高，协定也并不重要。随后的几篇论文都重申了这一观点。尽管这些论文解释了悖论的驱动力，但对稳定协议成员资格以及合作的实际和潜在收益的分析仍主要基于模拟。在本文中，我们对合作悖论所依据的所有项目进行了全面的分析。

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Barrett's paradox of cooperation: A full analytical proof 30 years after

In his seminal paper, Barrett (1994) argues that international environmental agreements (IEAs) are typically not successful, which he coined "the paradox of cooperation". If the potential gains from full cooperation would be large, self-enforcing IEAs have low participation and, therefore, cannot achieve much, or, if the potential gains are small, agreements are not important, even though IEAs may enjoy large participation. This message has been reiterated by several subsequent papers. Even though these papers explain the driving forces of the paradox, the analysis of membership in stable agreements and the actual and potential gains from cooperation are still mainly based on simulations. In this paper, we provide a full analytical characterization of all items on which the paradox of cooperation is based.

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来源期刊

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Multiple-

CiteScore

8.00

自引率

4.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management publishes theoretical and empirical papers devoted to specific natural resources and environmental issues. For consideration, papers should (1) contain a substantial element embodying the linkage between economic systems and environmental and natural resources systems or (2) be of substantial importance in understanding the management and/or social control of the economy in its relations with the natural environment. Although the general orientation of the journal is toward economics, interdisciplinary papers by researchers in other fields of interest to resource and environmental economists will be welcomed.