CEO权力来源与企业并购--来自中国上市家族企业的证据

IF 3.8 3区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

North American Journal of Economics and Finance Pub Date : 2024-09-19 DOI:10.1016/j.najef.2024.102290

Yuping Deng , Haicheng Wang , Cenjie Liu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

自中国宣布实施双循环战略以来，家族企业参与并购（M&As）的现象十分普遍。本文研究了家族首席执行官对企业并购的影响，并进一步解释了家族首席执行官如何通过降低代理成本和提高内部控制质量来影响企业的并购绩效。我们发现，由家族首席执行官控制的上市家族企业比由非家族首席执行官控制的家族企业具有更好的并购绩效，而且这种影响对于位于沿海地区或社会信任度低、股权限制少的地区的企业更为显著。我们的研究为协调家族企业治理与企业绩效之间的关系提供了重要参考。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Sources of CEO power and firm mergers & acquisitions——Evidence from Chinese listed family firms

Since the announcement of China’s dual circulation strategy, family firms’ participation in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been prevalent. This paper investigates the impacts of family CEOs on firm M&As and further explains how family CEOs affect firm M&A performance by reducing agency costs and enhancing internal control quality. We find that listed family firms controlled by family CEOs have better M&A performance than family firms controlled by non-family CEOs, and this effect is more profound for firms located in coastal areas or regions with low levels of social trust and equity restrictions. Our research provides an important reference for coordination between family business governance and firm performance.

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来源期刊

North American Journal of Economics and Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

7.30

自引率

8.30%

发文量

168

期刊介绍： The focus of the North-American Journal of Economics and Finance is on the economics of integration of goods, services, financial markets, at both regional and global levels with the role of economic policy in that process playing an important role. Both theoretical and empirical papers are welcome. Empirical and policy-related papers that rely on data and the experiences of countries outside North America are also welcome. Papers should offer concrete lessons about the ongoing process of globalization, or policy implications about how governments, domestic or international institutions, can improve the coordination of their activities. Empirical analysis should be capable of replication. Authors of accepted papers will be encouraged to supply data and computer programs.